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Chapter 1
Introduction
Housing, its costs and benefits, and its quality have kept researchers busy for a
very long time. New research questions and gaps are being uncovered almost
on a daily basis, not only by researchers in real estate finance and economics,
but also by scholars in other fields such as gender and cultural studies, psychol-
ogy, health and political sciences, architecture or urban planning. This is not
surprising as housing plays a key role in everyone’s life. A basic necessity, it is
part of talks with friends and family, of negotiations between a bank and an as-
piring homeowner, of taxation, or of people’s financial portfolios. Researchers
all over the world are wrapping their minds around real-estate-related ques-
tions and have even more so since the outbreak of the U.S. housing crisis in
2007, which has triggered a plethora of journal articles, conference presenta-
tions, and PhD dissertations.
In this thesis I provide three attempts to explain how housing affects indi-
viduals, households, and the economy. Therefore, my dissertation consists of
three core chapters in which I study different topics in housing economics: the
housing wealth effect in two subsamples of U.S. states (chapter 4), as well as the
implications of housing for physical (chapter 5) and economic growth (chapter
6), both in an international sample. Furthermore, this thesis provides two addi-
tional chapters which give an overview of different real estate markets (chapter
9
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3) and the theoretical implications of housing and non-housing capital for eco-
nomic growth (chapter 2). The following sections of this chapter will introduce
each of these contributions in greater detail.
1.1 Housing and the growth literature
In the mid-50s, Robert Solow (1956) presented his seminal model which ever
since has been used as a starting point to study the determinants of economic
growth (e.g., Mankiw et al., 1992). Contrary to the previous literature, Solow
assumes diminishing returns to capital and labor, which allows reaching a
steady state with full employment of the input factors.
According to Solow, the accumulation of physical capital is the engine
which makes the economy prosper: every period, a fraction of the output is
spared and reinvested into the capital stock, which then generates even more
output. One point of criticism, however, is that Solow assumes that all capital is
homogeneous, i.e., that all capital types earn the same return for the economy.
What if one departs from this assumption? Mills (1987), for instance, reports for
the U.S. that housing and non-housing capital earn different returns, namely
that the return to housing capital is only half that to non-housing, i.e., physical,
capital. This implies that if capital is not invested exclusively into production
of non-housing goods but also into housing, then the resulting output is lower
than Solow’s original model suggests.
Therefore, chapter 2 picks up the idea of heterogeneous capital and shows
how housing can distort capital allocation and, thereby, economic growth. It
also reviews the original Solow model and its extensions made by Mankiw et al.
(1992) and presents an overview of empirical tests of the model.
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1.2 Housing markets worldwide
Housing markets differ greatly by country—not only in regulatory and political
but also cultural and societal aspects. In Germany, for example, it is necessary
to register with the municipality where one lives permanently, and everyone
receives an identification card with that address on it. In other countries, such
as the USA, by contrast, one is not legally tied to their place of residence.
Another example concerns land prices in Japan, which have historically
been so high that the share of land in house prices increased from 40 to 90 per-
cent between 1890 and 1990 (Knoll et al., 2017). This provides an incentive to
keep properties in the family for speculation and bequests. Moreover, because
Japan has an aging population, real estate is a particularly attractive investment
for old-age provision.
Chapter 3, which is joint work with Ted Azarmi, has two aims. First, it
presents an overview of a number of cultural, taxation, regulatory, and insti-
tutional differences. In particular, real estate markets in Germany, the USA,
China, and Japan are discussed. Second, this chapter outlines the resulting in-
centives and economic consequences.
1.3 Housing and its effects on individuals, households,
and the economy
Chapter 4, also joint work with Ted Azarmi, revisits the housing wealth effect.
The real estate literature, most notably the study by Case et al. (2005), has found
by and large that increases in one’s housing wealth translate into increases in
consumption. In particular, because such changes are viewed as more perma-
nent than changes in, for example, stock market wealth, consumption responds
more strongly to housing than to financial wealth. This result has been conven-
tionally used to encourage homeownership.
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However, there are also theoretical and empirical studies that give examples
of a negative or non-existent housing wealth effect, for instance, when future
house prices are expected to rise and homeowners have a bequest motive. In
such cases, Skinner (1989) shows that households increase their savings rela-
tive to households without a bequest motive. Another example is the study by
Calomiris et al. (2009), who point out that the large and positive housing wealth
effect largely disappears once common endogeneity issues are properly taken
care of.
Lastly, even though it is well-known that consumption increases with the
mortgage level (Benjamin and Chinloy, 2008), past studies on the housing
wealth effect have not consistently controlled for mortgage debt at the house-
hold level.
We take into account the aforementioned criticisms and suggestions. Addi-
tionally, to study the effect of housing wealth on households and the economy
in more detail, we divide the sample in two mutually exclusive subsamples
based on the median homeownership rate. We do this because past research
has found that overinvestment in housing may impair economic growth (Mills,
1987, 1989; Hendershott, 1989), which can be directly tied to the argumentation
in chapter 2. Hence, we also examine the effect of housing wealth on GDP at
the U.S. states level.
Our study reveals that after controlling for mortgage debt and using more
appropriate methods to reduce endogeneity, households in U.S. states with
above-median homeownership rates do not adjust their consumption to in-
creases in their housing wealth, whereas households in states with below-
median homeownership rates do. On top of that, we find that changes in hous-
ing wealth have a significantly negative association with changes in GDP in
the above-median-homeownership sample, which we see as a confirmation of
the findings from the housing overinvestment literature. Our results suggest
that homeownership should not be encouraged unconditionally but only up to
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socially desirable, intermediate levels.
While the previous chapter focused on households, I use anthropometric
data in chapter 5 to study how housing quality affected individual height in a
panel of countries from the late 19th to the mid-20th century. In the economic
history literature, adult height is an established proxy for health, as there is no
other, uniform and unambiguous health indicator that was collected for a large
set of countries before the 1950s.
Adult height is determined by environmental influences that a person is
exposed to in childhood and adolescence. This is because one’s height potential
depends critically on the net nutritional status during one’s growth phase. A
child whose body uses up nutrients because of physically demanding labor or
that suffers diseases will become a shorter adult on average than a child that
grows up under more favorable circumstances. Such height differentials cannot
fully be made up for in later life. Because of this, healthy living conditions and
one’s disease environment are a crucial determinant of one’s final stature.
Housing is part of a person’s disease environment and therefore, its quality
in one’s earlier years of life have an influence on that person’s adult height. But
housing until the mid-20th century was very different from what we are used to
today: the number of persons per dwelling was relatively high (e.g., according
to Clark (2002), it was 5.17 in England and Wales during the decade 1870–1879),
favoring the spread of contagious diseases like diarrhea or whooping cough,
which in turn impaired children’s growth potential. Furthermore, bathrooms,
access to (hot) water and sewers were very uncommon, especially in earlier
periods. Water was mainly taken from town wells and was often contaminated
because of defecation in the open. Many of these problems still exist in today’s
developing countries (Konteh, 2009), highlighting the importance of research in
this area.
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Unfortunately, detailed records of housing quality for the period 1870–1965
do not exist. However, a study by Eichholtz et al. (2017) reports that housing
prices during the past 500 years rose with quality rather than due to increased
demand or monopoly behavior of landlords. Moreover, Margo (1996) finds that
homes with sanitary facilities and more floor space were traded at higher rent
prices than similar houses without these amenities. Therefore, this study uses
real house prices as a proxy for housing quality.
My study shows that house prices were a significant determinant of adult
height: after controlling for other factors, a one-point increase in the real house
price index came along with a 0.05 cm height differential. Over the whole study
period, this amounted to 1.5 cm taller adult heights, which was equivalent to
1.2–2.7 more years of life expectancy (Baten and Komlos, 1998).
Besides being the first study to address the studied relationship, this chap-
ter contributes to the literature twofold. First, because housing quality has been
consistently omitted in the anthropometric literature, effects of income and nu-
trition on height were most likely overestimated. Therefore, by controlling for
housing quality separately, I can act on these suggestions, which were made
by Komlos (1998, on income) and Margo and Steckel (1983, on nutrition). And
second, since in most developing countries and many slums, living standards
resemble those from past centuries’, now developed nations, the present find-
ings are relevant in today’s context too.
Housing has been seen as the superior tenure form in many countries. In
the U.S., for instance, mortgage interest payments are tax deductible, which
makes owner-occupied housing an affordable option for the majority of Amer-
icans. Many studies are thus dedicated to exploring the positive externalities of
homeownership. For instance, they find that homeowners tend to be wealthier
than renters (e.g., Haurin et al., 1996; Dietz and Haurin, 2003; Matha¨ et al., 2017)
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or that they create valuable social capital within their neighborhoods (e.g., Di-
Pasquale and Glaeser, 1999). Hence, the promotion of homeownership in many
countries seems plausible.
Nevertheless, there is reason to suspect that housing does not only have
benefits for an economy. As outlined in chapter 2, not all capital is homoge-
neous and earns the same social returns. Moreover, in an international com-
parison, there are large discrepancies in the fraction of owner-occupied versus
rented homes.
There are some studies that relate to this phenomenon. First, it is possible
that economies with high homeownership rates have overinvested in housing.
Hendershott and Hu (1981, 1983) have emphasized that the decline in U.S. pro-
ductivity in the 1970s and 80s was likely a cause of overinvestment in housing
which was caused by preferential treatment of residential investments in the
U.S. tax code. Second, Mills (1987, 1989) and Hendershott (1989) have estimated
that the social returns to physical capital exceed those to housing investments.
Hence, investments in physical capital should yield higher social returns than
investments in housing.
A synthesis of these studies suggests that overinvestment in housing can
have adverse effects on a country’s GDP growth. Therefore, to examine
whether housing investments have different consequences for an economy than
investments in non-housing, I study the relationship between per-capita GDP
growth and the fraction of homes that is inhabited by their owners in a panel of
countries in chapter 6.
It is not hard to imagine that homeownership is highly endogenous, which
is why I use an instrumental variable (IV) approach to study how homeowner-
ship affects GDP growth. After additionally controlling for a number of vari-
ables to reduce further endogeneity problems, I find evidence for an initially
positive impact of homeownership on the economy, as suggested by studies
on positive externalities. However, there is a critical homeownership rate after
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which this relationship becomes inverse: the negative externalities start to out-
weigh the positive ones at a homeownership rate of roughly 68 percent. Hence,
homeownership should not be encouraged beyond this socially optimal rate.
1.4 Conclusion
Housing plays a key role in everybody’s daily life and the whole economy.
Therefore, research on housing economics is not only important because of the
recent housing crisis. The three core chapters 4, 5 and 6 of this thesis shed light
on different research questions that relate housing to three key economic vari-
ables: wealth, health, and economic growth. Furthermore, these chapters study
housing economics from different perspectives by using data at the individual,
the household, and at the economy level. Two additional overview chapters
(2 and 3) provide further insights into the topic. Together, the chapters in this
dissertation contribute to our understanding of the role that housing plays for
welfare at different levels of aggregation.
But of course, even though the recent crisis has sparked new interest in
housing research, much is left to be done. For instance, the exact channels
through which housing investment may adversely affect economic growth have
not been studied in detail yet. Furthermore, our finding that housing wealth
in above-median-homeownership states comes along with increased consump-
tion but decreased GDP raises new interesting questions that deserve further
attention. Why is the link between consumption and GDP in regions with mod-
erate levels different from that in regions with high levels of homeownership?
Why do many households build up so much housing wealth in the first place?
Is it because of a lack of trust in the public retirement system? Why do many
wealthy households continue to rent their homes? More comparative work on
cultural and institutional aspects of homeownership could enhance our under-
standing of such phenomena and result in valuable policy recommendations.
Chapter 2
Homeownership and the
Economy: A Primer
2.1 The Solow model
2.1.1 How economies grow
In 1956, Solow presented a very influential model of economic growth and
thereby revolutionized the growth literature, which had previously been char-
acterized by constant returns to the inputs into production. Solow’s neoclassical
growth theory departs from this assumption and allows for the more realistic
and plausible notion of diminishing returns to the production factors. His the-
ory permits explaining phenomena such as China’s growth, which has consis-
tently outpaced the growth of more mature, industrialized economies, or the
fast recovery of the German economy after WWII. Let us focus on the latter of
these two examples.
After big parts of Germany were destroyed by bombing raids in WWII, the
country had to quickly re-erect harbors and its infrastructure, houses, and fac-
tories and, unexpectedly, recovered from the previous destruction within a sur-
prisingly short period of time. At the same time, however, winners of the war,
17
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such as the U.S., as well as nations that were not hit as hard continued to grow
at their usual, historical rates of around 2–3 percent. How could such a weak
economy eclipse the growth of all the winners, and how can the difference in
these growth rates be explained? The key ingredient of the Solow model which
sheds light on this growth miracle is a production function Y = F(K, L) which
is increasing in capital and labor, but with diminishing returns to these input
factors, i.e., ∂F/∂i > 0 and ∂2F/∂i2 < 0, i = K, L. He furthermore assumes a
closed economy.
Let us take a look at how economies grow according to Solow. In order
to prosper, an economy with a given labor force and capital stock will try to
produce output Y according to a production function:
Y = F(K, L). (2.1)
This output can be consumed or saved at a constant rate s. Solow also as-
sumes that this output is produced at a decreasing return to capital and labor
and that the production function has constant returns to scale1. The typical,
neoclassical production functions has to satisfy the so-called Inada conditions:
(1) lim
r→0
F(r, 1) = ∞ and (2) lim
r→∞ F(r, 1) = 0, where r is the capital stock per capita.
Since in Solow’s model, rent of capital and wages are flexible, the marginal pro-
ductivity equation ∂F/∂K and ∂F/∂L will adjust to the exogenous amounts of
labor and capital and deliver the marginal products which will be paid to the
two production factors. By this, it is guaranteed that capital and labor are per-
petually fully employed.
With all this information at hand, the economy can finally start up the en-
gine and produce output Y. The population will consume a fraction (1− s)Y
and save the remaining sY, which will be added to the economy’s capital stock,
1This latter is the distinguishing assumption between exogenous growth models, such as
Solow’s, and endogenous growth models, which were developed later and incorporated en-
dogenous technological progress. A prominent researcher in this area was, for instance, Romer.
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i.e., Kt+1 = Kt + sY. This notation says that capital accumulation is a develop-
ment over time. This process will repeat itself a finite number of times t because
of decreasing returns to capital and labor: at the end of each period, the new
values of capital and labor enter the marginal productivity equation and sub-
sequently the production function, and the fraction of the output Y which will
be saved is determined. Therefore, all the other variables are time-dependent
too as they evolve together with the capital stock, i.e., K = K(t), L = L(t) and
Y = Y(t).2 In continuous time, the equation of motion of the capital stock can
therefore be denoted by
dK
dt
= K˙ = sY (2.2)
However, at the same time that capital is added to the capital stock, other
capital is worn out and has to be replaced. Because of the diminishing-returns-
to-inputs property, there will be a point where additions to and deductions from
capital are just equal. That is, at some point in time, the economy will eventually
reach an equilibrium, i.e., a point where net investments are zero and the econ-
omy arrives at a resting state which can only be shaken by exogenous shocks.
Formally, this resting state can be derived by substituting equation 2.1 into 2.2:
K˙ = sF(K, L) (2.3)
Because of one equation in two unknowns, another equation is needed to
close the system:
L(t) = L0ent (2.4)
This equation assumes that labor development over time grows as an ex-
ogenously given growth rate n.3 This equation can also be viewed as a labor
2To avoid notational clutter, the variables’ dependence on t will subsequently be omitted.
3In the Solow model, the population size is equivalent to the workforce. Therefore, “per
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supply curve where labor is completely inelastic. Combining equations 2.3 and
2.4 and thereby assuming that labor is fully employed perpetually yields the
following equation:
K˙ = sF(K, L0ent) (2.5)
This equation contains only one unknown, which is K(t) and represents the
capital stock development over time under full labor employment.
Now that the basis is laid, let us move to per-capita values to analyze how
an economy grows. Let r = K/L be the capital stock per worker or, in Solow’s
words, the capital–labor ratio. This expression can be rearranged and comple-
mented by equation 2.4 to yield K = rL = rL0ent. As r depends on K and L,
which themselves vary over time, r = r(t) is also time-dependent. Differentiat-
ing with respect to time thus leads to K˙ = r˙L0ent + nrL0ent. We can equate this
with the expression in equation 2.5 and rearrange terms:
r˙L0ent + nrL0ent = sF(K, L0ent)
(r˙ + nr)L0ent = sF(K, L0ent).
While r is the capital–labor ratio, r˙ = dr/dt captures the additions to or sub-
tractions from the capital–labor ratio over time. To now transform the right-
hand side (RHS) into per-capita values, Solow exploits the constant returns
property of the production function F(zK, zL) = zF(K, L), which permits taking
the labor term L0ent out of the production function4, and simplifies:
(r˙ + nr)L0ent = L0entsF(K/L0ent, 1)
r˙ = sF(K/L0ent, 1)− nr
r˙ = sF(r, 1)− nr
(2.6)
capita” and “per worker” will from now on be used interchangeably.
4Constant returns to scale imply that the size of the economy, measured by its workforce, does
not affect the capital–labor and output–labor ratios. Therefore, every variable can be expressed
in per-capita values.
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This fundamental equation explains how and when a steady state is
reached. The first term on the RHS, F(r, 1), describes the output that is gen-
erated by employing r units of capital and one unit of labor, or, equivalently,
it is the output per capita as a function of capital per capita. Multiplied by the
saving rate s, the term represents savings per capita. The second term, by con-
trasts, is the break-even investment that has to be added such that the capital
stock does not decrease. As was initially discussed, an equilibrium is reached
when additions to and deductions from the capital stock are equal, i.e., when
sF(r, 1) = nr or, equivalently, r˙ = 0. This relationship is depicted in figure
2.2. The steady-state level of the capital–labor ratio can be derived by setting
equation 2.6 equal to zero:
r∗ =
s
n
F(r, 1). (2.7)
The corresponding level of output per person is then
y∗ = F(r∗, 1). (2.8)
Figure 2.1 provides four important insights. First, shows what happens
when an economy’s capital–labor ratio approaches the equilibrium r∗ from the
left or right, i.e., when r 6= r∗. When r > r∗, then nr > sF. Because of
r˙ = sF(r, 1) − nr, we know that in such a case, r would decrease towards r∗.
This is because when we approach the equilibrium from the right, then labor
L increases at a higher rate than do capital K and output Y, and therefore, the
capital–labor ratio r = K/L will decrease and bounce back to its steady-state
value r∗. When we think of the nr ray as the depreciation of capital, then the
additions that are made to the capital stock are not large enough to compensate
for the depreciation of the capital stock. Therefore, the capital stock will gradu-
ally decrease until r∗ is reached. Analogously, if r < r∗, capital and output will
increase at a faster pace than labor, and the capital–labor ratio would bounce
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Figure 2.1: A steady state of per-capita income.
sF(r,1)
nr
r∗ r
Note: Based on Solow (1956).
back to the equilibrium r∗ too. Hence, r∗ is a stable equilibrium. In a nutshell,
economies that have reached their steady state will remain in this state whereas
economies that have not reached it yet, will evolve towards their steady state.
Second, figure 2.1 shows what happens when two economies employ dif-
ferent amounts of capital but have otherwise identical characteristics. Let us
compare two economies I and II. The economy of the first type is characterized
by large investments in capital, whereas the second economy has a lower capital
stock; all other things equal. Let us for now ignore the reasons that may lead to
this set-up. Because the first economy has more capital at hand for production,
the capital–labor ratio rI > rI I . The assumption of identical production func-
tions implies that therefore, the type I economy will produce a higher output
per capita than the type II economy: yI > yI I . It also implies that an economy of
the first type is closer to reaching its steady state than an economy of the second
type.
Depending on the shape of the production function, it can also happen that
the economy with less capital per capita reaches a stable but inferior equilib-
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rium: with a higher capital–labor ratio than the second economy, the first one
will reach r∗I , which leads to a higher per-capita output than does r
∗
I I I , which
may be reached by the otherwise identical country with much lower capital
investments of r < r∗I I . This case is depicted in figure 2.2.
Figure 2.2: Two steady states of per-capita income.
sF(r,1)
nr
r∗I I I r∗I I r
∗
I
r
Note: Based on Solow (1956).
Third, when r˙ = 0, the capital–labor ratio is a constant and output per per-
son is a constant too. In other words, in the absence of technological progress,
there is no output and capital growth at the per-capita level, as the population
and total output grow at the same rate. Therefore, this “plain” version of the
Solow model fails to explain the empirically observable growth in per-capita
output across countries over the last decades or centuries, as only exogenous
shocks, such as a higher saving rate or a more efficient production technology,
can raise output per capita to a new, higher steady-state level. To overcome
this theoretical shortcoming, technological change was shortly later added to
the model and has then become known as the textbook Solow model. In that
version, per-capita income in the long-run equilibrium grows at the rate of tech-
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nological change. This will be shown in the next subsection.
And fourth, it provides an answer to the question raised in the beginning:
How could Germany’s economy grow so fast after WWII while the winners
could not? Because Germany had lost all its capital, the first units of capital put
into production generated a very high output. This is due to the concave shape
of the production and, consequently, also the savings curve, which have a steep
slope at lower capital levels. In other words: the marginal productivity of capi-
tal is higher at lower capital levels than at higher ones. Countries whose capital
stock was not destroyed did not enjoy such high returns to capital because at
higher capital levels, the returns to capital diminish.
This last reason provides an important implication. In essence, holding
population growth and saving rates constant, the model predicts that poor
countries (i.e., countries with lower capital–labor ratios and therefore lower
per-capita output) should grow faster than richer countries and that all these
countries should reach similar steady states. This theory is known as condi-
tional convergence. It implies that countries with similar characteristics will
converge over time. On the contrary, countries with different saving and popu-
lation growth rates, such as Germany and Somalia, will not converge according
to this theory. This discrepancy in productivity could be shown empirically by
Islam (1995), which will be discussed in a later subsection.
2.1.2 Some interim conclusions
The above version of the Solow model makes some powerful predictions: first,
countries with higher saving rates should grow faster. Second, countries with
higher population growth should grow more slowly. When one looks at these
two hypotheses and confronts them with empirical data, they can generally be
confirmed. However, another prediction of this version of the model, which so
far neglects any technological progress, is that every country reaches a steady
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state in which output per capita does not grow anymore. On its path to this
steady state, the country should exhibit per-capita growth rates that diminish
until they become zero. This is due to the concave shape of the production and
saving functions. Think of the example with Germany and the U.S. again: ac-
cording to the model, the U.S. should have zero growth by now given that since
WWII, it must have accumulated enough capital to have reached its steady state
in the meantime. Hence, according to the model, the U.S. should have ceased to
grow in per-capita terms by now. Even though the U.S. has lower growth rates
per capita than poorer countries (consider China), its growth rate is still far from
zero. Also, we have witnessed improving standards of living and increasing
per-capita income over time. In a nutshell, while this basic model has implica-
tions that are generally correct, it fails to explain continuous per-capita growth
because it does not model technological progress. On top of that, if the Solow
(1956) model is considered to be complete, then a lot of countries should ex-
hibit similar steady-state levels of output. This prediction cannot be confirmed
empirically as per-capita incomes globally vary a lot. Therefore, Mankiw et al.
published a paper in 1992 in which they argue that the Solow model is an in-
complete description of the growth process and conclude that it is missing a
puzzle piece which could explain more of the observable cross-country varia-
tion.
Furthermore, they remark that an empirical test of the traditional Solow
model conflicts with generally accepted values for the share of capital in an
economy: their obtained regression coefficients imply a capital share that is
about twice the size of the commonly accepted share of capital in GDP of
around α = 1/3. To come up with this result, they use data from 1960–1985 to
test if the paths of the saving and population growth rates over time can predict
1985 GDP per-capita levels. In other words, they test the hypotheses outlined
above: that higher saving rates and lower population growth rates can predict
economic output per capita. They employ a Cobb–Douglas function and, next
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to population growth n, explicitly model technological change as increasing at
the exogenous rate g:
Y(t) = K(t)α[A(t)L(t)]1−α, 0 < α < 1
L(t) = L(0)ent
A(t) = A(0)egt
(2.9)
Note that this new production function now incorporates labor-augmenting
technological change A(t) which leaves capital unaffected, since capital’s share
in income has been roughly constant over time. Instead of deriving per-capita
values, Mankiw et al. turn to values per effective unit of labor, i.e., they set
y˜ = Y/AL and k˜ = K/AL (i.e., what was the capital–labor ratio r in the 1956
model is now the capital-per-effective-unit-of-labor ratio k˜). Furthermore, capi-
tal depreciates linearly at the rate δ. The fundamental equation of motion of the
capital stock is then
˙˜k(t) = sk˜(t)α − (n + g + δ)k˜(t). (2.10)
Let us now recall the issue of (conditional) convergence, as the above equa-
tion can be used as a starting point to determine the speed at which countries
should converge to their steady states. As Solow’s model dictates that in the
steady state, ˙˜k = 0, we can solve equation 2.10 for the steady-state value k˜∗:
k˜∗ =
[
s
n + g + d
] 1
1−α
(2.11)
To approximate the rate of convergence in the vicinity of the steady state,
we exploit the fact that because of the concave shape of the production function,
the growth rate of the per-effective-unit-of-labor capital stock around the steady
state,
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G(k˜) =
˙˜k
k˜
= sk˜α−1 − (n + g + δ), (2.12)
is approximately zero. Therefore, we can linearize this growth rate around
the steady state with a Taylor approximation of first order:
G(k˜) ≈ G(k˜∗) + G′(k˜∗)(k˜− k˜∗)
≈ (1− α)(n + g + δ)(ln k˜∗ − ln k˜).
Because y = k˜α and therefore, ln y˜ = α ln k˜, the output growth rate is ap-
proximately
˙˜y
y
=
d ln Y
dt
= (1− α)(n + g + δ)(ln y∗ − ln y) (2.13)
That is, λ = (1− α)(n + g + δ) is the speed of convergence. Because the
parameters in λ are percentage values, the convergence speed is the percentage
gap between ln y∗ and ln y that is closed every period.
[For a formal derivation of this result, see the appendix A1]
Let us now return to the test of the Solow model conducted by Mankiw et
al. They determine the steady-state level of per-capita output as follows:
ln
Y(t)
L(t)
= ln A(0) + gt +
α
1− α ln(s)−
α
1− α ln(n + g + δ) (2.14)
[For a formal derivation of this result, see the appendix A2]
In their empirical analysis, they take GDP per capita in 1985 of a cross-
section of countries as the dependent variable and explain this level with pre-
1985 average values of the independent Solow variables. By doing this, they
assume that in 1985, their sampled countries were already in their steady states
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and exhibited zero per-capita growth. A test of this equation confirms the pre-
dictions of the Solow model; however, the authors realize that something is not
right: because of the log-form of the equation, the second and third term on the
RHS can be interpreted as the elasticities of income with respect to the saving
rate s and to (n + g + δ), respectively. Because the share of capital in an econ-
omy’s income is about α = 1/3, the coefficients on the two elasticities should
be α1−α = 0.5 and − α1−α = −0.5, respectively. Their empirical coefficients, how-
ever, are much higher and imply a capital share in income of around 60 percent.
Therefore, the magnitudes of the impact of s and (n+ g+ δ) are overestimated.
2.1.3 Accounting for human capital accumulation
Mankiw et al. see the aforementioned overestimation of the coefficients on s
and (n+ g+ δ) as evidence of an omitted variable bias in the Solow model and
come up with another version of the model in which output is not produced
by capital and labor only but also by human capital. The inclusion of human
capital in economic growth models had already been advocated before, e.g., by
Romer (1986) or Lucas (1988). Like physical capital, human capital has posi-
tive but diminishing returns β. In order to make sure that a steady state can
be reached, the assumption of constant returns to scale has to be maintained.
Output can now be saved in the form of physical and human capital HC at the
saving rates sk and shc.
Their new production function takes the form
Y(t) = K(t)αHC(t)β[A(t)L(t)]1−α−β,
0 < α < 1,
0 < β < 1,
α+ β < 1.
(2.15)
Furthermore, they make the assumption that human capital depreciates at
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the same rate δ as physical capital. The capital accumulation equations are thus
K˙ = skY− dK
H˙C = shcY− dHC
(2.16)
The economy then evolves according to the following physical-capital and
human-capital accumulation processes:
k˙(t) = sky(t)− (n + g + δ)k(t)
h˙c(t) = shcy(t)− (n + g + δ)hc(t)
(2.17)
These two equations should not be viewed in isolation. We know from the
augmented model that the same production function applies to both capital
types, i.e., they are rival production inputs. After output has been produced,
part of it is consumed and the rest is now divided between savings in human
capital shc and savings in physical capital sk. Building up human capital makes
the workers more skilled in subsequent periods, which allows them to in turn
produce more output. The output per capita in the economy with the aug-
mented production function will increase faster than in an economy with only
capital and labor. With more output, more can be reinvested in physical capi-
tal, which is then transformed into more output by more skilled workers. The
steady-state output per effective unit of labor y˜∗ = Y∗/AL can then be ex-
pressed as follows:
y˜∗ =
[
sk
n + g + δ
] α
1−α−β [ shc
n + g + δ
] β
1−α−β
(2.18)
Because
(
Y(t)
L(t)
)∗
= y(t)∗ = A(t)y˜(t)∗, y˜ = Y/AL and A˙(t) = gA(t), it
follows that y˙y = g. That is, in the version with labor-augmenting technological
change, per-capita income in the steady state grows at the rate of technological
progress—irrespective of whether human capital is included or not.
Mankiw et al. then derive the regression equation that they use for the test
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of their augmented model:
ln
Y
L
= ln A(0) + gt +
[
α+ β
1− α− β
]
ln(n + g + δ)
+
[
α
1− α− β
]
ln(sk) +
[
β
1− α− β
]
ln(shc)
(2.19)
What can be said about the differences in steady-state output per capita
between the two versions of the model? Note that if we set β = 0 in equation
2.18 we obtain the output per effective unit of labor for the standard Solow case
without human capital:
y∗S =
[
sk
n + g + δ
] α
1−α
(2.20)
Therefore, y∗ > y∗S. This result implies that human capital is not only in-
cluded to generate more realistic coefficients and implied capital shares; the
augmented model explicitly allows for human capital to magnify the effect
of physical capital for the generation of output: because more skilled work-
ers can use physical capital more productively, the production function of the
augmented model lies above an otherwise identical curve without human cap-
ital. Therefore, in an economy with the augmented production function, more
output can be generated and hence, more output can be saved and reinvested.
This leads to a more accelerated accumulation of physical capital per capita and
to a higher steady-state level of output per capita.
[For a formal derivation of this result, see the appendix A3]
2.2 Empirical tests of the (augmented) Solow model
2.2.1 Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992): an OLS approach
Equation 2.19 describes GDP per capita levels as a function of the RHS vari-
ables. Studying this equation requires the assumption that the countries be in
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their steady states or randomly distributed around them. Mankiw et al. (1992)
test this equation using a large dataset spanning the period 1960–1985, with
1985-per-capita incomes as their dependent and average values over 1960–1985
as their independent variables. That is to say, even though they could analyze
the data in a panel setting, they transform the data to a cross-sectional format.
The econometric issue arising from this procedure will be discussed in the next
subsection. Their test not only delivers the desired implied capital share of one
third—which was the reason why they plead for the inclusion of human capital
in the first place—the explanatory power of the observed cross-country produc-
tivity differences also increases from R2 = 0.59 to R2 = 0.78.
Mankiw et al. acknowledge that the sampled countries may not be in their
steady states or may not randomly depart from them. In a next step, they there-
fore derive a growth equation which permits analysis of growth paths towards
a steady state. Deriving a growth equation requires a linearization in the vicin-
ity of the steady state. They then solve a non-homogeneous differential equa-
tion of first degree that depends on the convergence rate. Lastly, the solution
of the aforementioned differential equation can be expanded and written as a
growth equation:
ln y(t)− ln y(0) = (1− e−λt)
[
α
1− α− β
]
ln(sk) + (1− e−λt)
[
β
1− α− β
]
ln(sh)
− (1− e−λt)
[
α+ β
1− α− β
]
ln(n + g + δ)− (1− e−λt) ln y(0)
(2.21)
where λ = (n + g + δ)(1− α− β).
[For a formal derivation of this result, see the appendix A4]
Their model predicts that with conventional values for α = β = 1/3 and
n + g + δ = 0.06, a country should have a convergence rate of λMRW = 0.02
and move halfway towards its steady state in tMRW = ln(0.5)0.02 = 35 years. The
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empirical test of the (augmented) growth regression fits this predicted λ pretty
well. The respective values for the textbook Solow model, in contrast, would
be much more ambitious: λS = 0.04 and tS = 17 years. The growth literature
has, however, come to the conclusion that the convergence rate may range any-
where between low single- and low double-digit numbers. With their paper,
Mankiw et al. revived the convergence debate which had been superseded by
the development of endogenous-growth models in the 1980s, which abandoned
the assumption of a steady state and hence, convergence, completely.
Generally, the Solow model augmented by Mankiw et al. makes three con-
tributions to the growth literature: first, human capital is added as a produc-
tion factor with positive returns, which generates more credible regression co-
efficients, implying realistic values for capital’s share in GDP (one third) and
labor’s share in GDP (one third for raw labor and one third for human capital).
Second, the explanatory power of the Solow model as measured by R2 is im-
proved dramatically, which means that much more cross-country variation can
be explained when human capital is additionally accounted for. And third, by
including human capital, the rate of convergence falls from 0.04 to 0.02.
2.2.2 Islam (1995): a panel approach
However, the analysis done by Mankiw et al. (1992) also suffers from “two
sources of inconsistency” (Caselli et al., 1996, p. 364), one of which relates
to the term A(0). While they acknowledge that “it [the A(0) term] may (...)
differ across countries” (pp. 410–411), they ignore this fact in their empirical
test: when country-specific shocks such as preferences or technologies are not
observable—which is the case—and potentially correlated with the explanatory
variables, then OLS cannot be used and one has to account for this unobserv-
able heterogeneity by using a fixed effects panel approach.
The above argument was analyzed in detail by Islam (1995). He shows that
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the unobserved heterogeneity lies in the term A(0) which “reflects not just tech-
nology but resource endowments, climate, institutions, and so on” (Mankiw
et al., 1992, pp. 410–411). Nevertheless, they let ln A(0) = a + ε; but while a
is a common intercept, ε is assumed to be independent from s and n. This last
assumption is highly debatable, and there are two reasons why this assump-
tion may be wrong: (1) some components of A(0) may be correlated with the
observed RHS variables; it is, for instance, very likely that population growth
and technology are correlated. If this is true, then the omission of A(0) from
the regression causes omitted variable bias. And (2), Islam shows that this A(0)
term is time-invariant. His formal derivation of this result is as follows:
ln yˆ(t2)− ln yˆ(t1) = (1− e−λτ) α1− α ln(s)− (1− e
−λτ)
α
1− α ln(n + g + δ)
− (1− e−λτ) ln yˆ(t1)
(2.22)
The above equation is the one that Mankiw et al. use to test the textbook
Solow model. The yˆ’s are per effective worker. To test the model, however, they
use per-capita data. This requires a slight modification of the equation. As the
per-effective-worker income is
yˆ(t) =
Y(t)
A(t)L(t)
=
Y(t)
L(t)A(t)egt
(2.23)
and
ln yˆ(t) = ln
(
Y(t)
L(t)
)
− ln A(0)− gt = ln y(t)− ln A(0)− gt, (2.24)
it follows that the per-capita income is
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ln y(t2) = (1− e−λτ) α1− α ln(s)− (1− e
−λτ)
α
1− α ln(n + g + δ)
+ e−λτ ln y(t1) + (1− e−λτ) ln A(0) + g(t2 − e−λτt1)
(2.25)
The above equation shows that the A(0) term is time-invariant, and it was
already outlined earlier that it is highly unlikely that components of A(0) are
independent from the RHS variables. These two reasons render the OLS estima-
tor invalid. Therefore, Islam proposes a panel approach and abandons the as-
sumption of identical production functions across countries. He thereby makes
another contribution to the growth literature: because he uses the LSDV esti-
mator, which is otherwise identical to the fixed effects estimator, he gets coeffi-
cients on the country dummy variables, which represent institutions, resource
endowments, or country-specific technology5.
To test this model, Islam uses a very similar dataset to that used by Mankiw
et al. (1992) and employs the fixed effects estimator to both the textbook and the
human-capital-augmented Solow model. Because he corrects for omitted vari-
able bias, which is commonly known to alter the coefficient of the exogenous
variables with which the omitted factor is correlated, he obtains an implied cap-
ital share α which comes much closer to the conventional value of one third. In
that respect, he provides evidence in favor of the Solow model. Because of the
mathematic relationship between the estimated coefficient on initial capital, γ,
on the one hand and the convergence rate on the other, λ = ln(γ)τ , a correct—i.e.,
a lower—estimate of γ leads to convergence rate that must be higher than that
estimated by Mankiw et al.. As a result, he obtains convergence rates between
roughly 4 and 10 percent, depending on the sample. Islam explains this finding
as
“consistent with the generic finding of faster convergence among
5This assumption challenges the view that technology may be a public good. Instead, the use
of technology can be restricted through, i.e., patent laws.
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groups of similar countries that have been reported earlier by re-
searchers. Instead of adopting the panel data approach, the other
way to control for differences in technology and institutions is to
classify the countries into similar groups. Baumol (1986) coined the
term ‘convergence club’ to express this phenomenon. (...) What we
have done in this paper is, by adoption of a panel data approach, to
allow for differences in the aggregate production function not only
across groups of countries (however defined), but across individual
countries. As a result, we obtain higher rates of convergence over
the samples as a whole” (Islam, 1995, p. 1149).
Another interesting result is that the panel regression including human cap-
ital produces broadly the same results as the one without human capital, and
that the coefficient on human capital does not behave as expected. This finding
is, however, not new in the growth literature, and one explanation may be that
human capital may enter the production function in a more elaborate way, e.g.,
as an interaction effect with the rate of technological change.
Lastly, by allowing for different production functions across his sampled
countries, Islam’s findings suggest that besides the population growth and sav-
ing rate, whose importance has been emphasized by Solow, the components
of A(0)—like climate, institutions, technology, or resource endowments, which
are all potentially correlated with the RHS variables—are important determi-
nants of the steady-state level of income. Nevertheless, while he finds a credible
value for the implied share of capital, he rejects the Solow model on the basis of
his implied convergence rate.
2.2.3 Caselli, Esquivel, and Lefort (1996): a Difference GMM ap-
proach
Islam (1995) was able to solve part of the two pitfalls that the empirical setting
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in the paper by Mankiw et al. encountered by employing a panel approach
in order to control for unobserved heterogeneity across countries. However,
there remains another source of endogeneity which Islam has not resolved. This
econometric issue lies in the set-up of the regression equation
ln(Yi,t)− ln(Yi,t−τ) = β ln(Yi,t−τ) +Wi,t−τδ+ ηi + ξt + ε i,t, (2.26)
where ηi are unobservable individual fixed effects. This equation can be
rewritten as follows:
ln(yi,t) = β˜ ln(yi,t−τ) +Wi,t−τδ+ ηi + ξt + ε i,t, (2.27)
where β˜ = 1 + β and yi,t = ln(Yi,t). Per-capita income is clearly a function
of the lagged per-capita income, and consequently, this model is dynamic and
requires special estimation procedures which can handle endogeneity. While
Islam rightly accounted for unobserved heterogeneity, he did not properly ac-
count for this last issue. This implies that the convergence rate and other coeffi-
cients in his analysis are unreliable. Caselli et al. (1996) recognize this problem
and propose to employ a Difference General Method of Moments (GMM) esti-
mator in order to generate more credible results. This is a panel-data estimator
which removes both the individual effects and the problem of endogeneity.
They replicate the tests by Mankiw et al. and Knight et al. (1993) whose pa-
per is close to that of Islam (1995) and additionally test these model specifica-
tions using the Difference GMM estimator. Furthermore, they perform a test of
the human-capital-augmented version of the Solow model. Their—now, appar-
ently, consistent—results suggest that the convergence rate and their implied
capital share are not in line with the Solow model’s predictions. In particular,
they obtain convergence rates of around 10 percent, and their specification tests
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indicate that there is endogeneity in the RHS variables. They therefore reject
the “restrictive framework of the Solow model and look at more general for-
mulations” (p. 376). In that version, they depart from the strictly model-based
specification of the Solow model and run a determinants-of-growth regression
in which they control for a set of additional variables proposed by Barro. In that
step, they also add measures of international trade and thereby adopt an open-
economy version of the neoclassical model. They still find evidence against the
Solow model’s predictions concerning the convergence rate, but they also find
support for an open-economy version of the Solow model. Again, their spec-
ification test rejects the hypothesis of exogenous explanatory variables, which
leads them to the conclusion that the saving rate is determined simultaneously
with the level of income per capita.
Because they obtain high convergence rates, they deduce that the sample
countries must be in the neighborhood of their steady states most of the time.
This, however, conflicts with their observed, rather high growth rates, which in
theory should be rather small (and diminishing to zero) when an economy is
close to its steady state. They interpret this result as follows. Because the control
variables on the RHS of the equation may vary, they represent shocks to the
steady states of the sampled economics. “Such shocks to the steady state set the
transition process in motion again. Countries with exceptionally high growth
rates are countries that experience repeated shifts ‘forward’ in the steady state
during the sample period” (p. 381).
The paper by Caselli et al. is another one that rejects some assumptions
and implications of the Solow model. However, it must be noted that they also
find evidence for some important determinants of growth, such as international
measures of trade. While this paper represents another step in the right direc-
tion and removes another technical issue of growth empirics, econometricians
have yet produced another, better estimator for growth regressions: System
GMM (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) was developed af-
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ter Caselli et al. wrote their paper. This estimator is even more efficient than
the Difference GMM estimator and is nowadays state-of-the-art in growth em-
pirics.
2.2.4 Growth empirics and convergence: some points of criticism
The empirical growth literature has been somewhat inconclusive about the
question how the growth patterns of economies can be best described. After
endogenous growth models had evolved more or less in parallel during the
1980s, it was the paper by Mankiw et al. (1992) which led to a revival of the ex-
ogenous growth literature. The endogenous growth literature aimed at endog-
enizing technological progress because up to 1992, empirical tests of the Solow
model had not been able to explain a lot of the observable differences in pro-
ductivity around the globe. With the publication of the paper by Mankiw et al.
and their implementation of human capital as an additional production factor,
researchers conceded that exogenous growth models could explain much more
of the cross-country variation than had been expected and reported in earlier
studies. In that literature, however, inconsistent results have led to ongoing de-
bates6. Therefore, this concluding subsection briefly discusses some criticisms
that the findings of the exogenous growth literature, especially those relating to
convergence, have drawn in the past three decades.
Counter-intuitively, researchers have reported “poorly-behaved”, i.e., neg-
ative, or positive but insignificant, coefficients on human capital. One possible
explanation for this phenomenon relating to the specification of the production
function was outlined earlier in this chapter. Notwithstanding these empiri-
cal findings, economists agree that human capital contributes significantly to
economic growth (Islam, 1995).
Much of the critique in the growth literature also refers to the rate of
6In their introductory section, Caselli et al. (1996) jokingly remark that reaching a consensus
among empirical macroeconomists is “a rare occurrence”.
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convergence—theoretically and empirically. Strictly speaking, computing a
convergence rate from a coefficient obtained in a growth regression requires
that a country be in the neighborhood of its steady state. This is because the
convergence rate is derived from a linearization of the capital accumulation
process in the vicinity of that country’s long-run equilibrium. If a country is
not in that neighborhood, then the convergence rate is not informative, as the
mathematical error becomes larger.
This also implies that, theoretically, convergence rates should be higher for
countries that are closer to their steady state than for countries that are a lit-
tle farther away, as with a higher convergence rate, it takes less time to reach
the steady state. Caselli et al. (1996) argue that a high convergence rate implies
a relatively short distance from that country’s steady state. Therefore, growth
empiricists have come to the conclusion that convergence rates may be accept-
able even if they surpass the predicted value of the Solow model of 2–3 percent.
Caselli et al., for instance, find convergence rates up to around 13 percent for
the textbook Solow model and of around 10 percent for an alternative model
including several additional control variables.
The aforementioned argument requires that (as countries may find them-
selves in different positions on their path towards their steady state) there be
different convergence rates for each individual economy. However, from a re-
gression on an arbitrarily large number of economies, only one single conver-
gence rate can be derived. This implies that for all the sampled economies and
across all years, the convergence rate has to be the same. This idea is highly
questionable. Under certain conditions, the same argument applies to the rate
of technological progress, g, which is commonly assumed to be the same across
countries: as long as a very diverse set of countries is studied, the assumption
of identical technological change can be challenged. Baumol (1986), therefore,
coined the term “club convergence”, which suggests that groups of very similar
countries should have very similar convergence rates. Another example is the
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paper by Barro and Sala-i Martin (1992), where not a panel of countries but of
U.S. states is studied. In such a setting, it is relatively safe to assume that pref-
erences and technology are roughly identical across economies. And in fact, the
authors even find evidence for absolute convergence across the U.S. states.
Nevertheless, all the above arguments referring to convergence do not make
the study of growth empirics obsolete—it should, however, be acknowledged
that computing a convergence rate from a regression coefficient on initial capital
may not always contribute to our understanding of the growth process. Some-
thing similar is true for the implied capital share in GDP that can be derived
from the coefficient on the saving rate: it is well-understood that the saving
rate, as well as the population growth rate, are important policy variables and
contribute significantly to economic growth. However, as different studies try
to explain economic growth from different perspectives, the theoretical coeffi-
cient on saving, as it was developed by Solow (1956), may take very different
mathematical forms. Therefore, deriving an implied capital share from that co-
efficient may not always be straightforward.
Last but not least, even though the above discussed papers by Mankiw et al.
(1992), Islam (1995) and Caselli et al. (1996) reject the strictly model-based spec-
ification of the Solow model, they still agree that the general predictions of the
textbook and the augmented version(s) referring to the explanatory variables
(i.e., that the saving rate, population growth, or human capital determine the
steady state level of income and the growth path towards the long-run equilib-
rium) are valid. In particular, Caselli et al. (1996) plead for the use of more gen-
eral formulations instead of the specific functional form of the original Solow
model. This view is broadly shared in the growth literature. Therefore, notwith-
standing the criticism that its implications and assumptions have received, the
Solow model is still one of the most prominent growth models and probably
the most cited starting point for further extensions in the growth literature.
This has to do also with the emergence of appropriate econometric techniques
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which now make it possible to prevent several pitfalls that earlier researchers
had faced and to estimate growth models that can explain a relatively large
fraction of the observed differences in GDP levels or growth rates.
2.3 How housing can distort capital allocation and
growth
Let us now return to the traditional Solow model7 and assume that an economy
with a given initial endowment V can invest in residential investment (hous-
ing) and business investment (in Solow’s language: capital). Investing more in
one of the two assets inevitably results in lower investment in the other. One
finding which supports this argument is the one by Hendershott and Hu (1981,
1983) who have criticized the overinvestment in housing in the U.S. of the 1970s
which led to a decrease in the capital–labor ratio and therefore to diminish-
ing economic growth. This result can easily be derived with the Solow model
because under the same production technology, a worker with less capital at
hand cannot produce more than another worker with more capital. One could
therefore say that, while businesses are productive assets because of their en-
trepreneurial value to society, investment in housing may not lead to the same
economic growth as does business activity. Mills (1987), for instance, estimated
that the social return to housing capital is only half that to non-housing capital.
More drastically, housing investment may even lead to no growth at all. Un-
der this assumption, then in this modified version of the Solow model, housing
does not enter the production function as an additional production factor (like-
wise, one could assume that dF/dH = 0). Instead, it will be captured indirectly
through a relationship with capital K: business investment K and housing in-
vestment H are rivals, i.e., a dollar can be put either into housing or into pro-
7This is done for the sake of simplicity. The following analysis holds true regardless if one
accounts for human capital or not.
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duction. Therefore, there is no reason to model housing investments separately.
Moreover, this implies that for every dollar that an economy invests in housing
instead of the entrepreneurial sector, it forgoes a return for the economy. This
assumption fundamentally differs from the way how Mankiw et al. (1992) in-
corporate their additional production factor, who assume a positive return to
human capital. In particular, let
K = K(H)
where
dK
dH
< 0.
(2.28)
The value of K depends on the value of H. This idea fundamentally chal-
lenges the assumption made by Solow that all capital is homogeneous and
earns the same return for the economy. But because V = K + H, any addi-
tional investment in housing decreases capital investment and, consequently,
also the capital–labor ratio. Using the aforementioned example, dK/dH = −1.
The resulting production function in the augmented Solow model is therefore
Y = F[K(H), L], or, in per-capita terms,
y = F[r(H), 1]. (2.29)
Note that all the other properties that the classical Solow setup possesses
are not affected by this modification. Also, because the inclusion of housing
investment does not affect the production function and its diminishing-returns-
to-the-inputs property, the predictions of (conditional) convergence theory still
hold. In other words, the Inada conditions, which describe a neoclassical pro-
duction function, are still fulfilled.
The capital–labor ratio r is a function of capital K, which in turn is a func-
tion of housing H: r = r[K(H)]. So what happens when housing investment
increases?
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∂r
∂H
=
dr
dK
· dK
dH
< 0. (2.30)
Of course, capital per capita will decrease, because, while dr/dK > 0,
capital and housing investment are negatively related as posited in equation
2.28. With this result and the standard Solow assumption that higher capital-
labor ratios lead to more output per capita, one can find that output per capita
y = Fr[K(H), 1] decreases when housing investment increases:
∂y
∂H
=
∂F
∂r
· dr
dK
· dK
dH
< 0. (2.31)
This result refutes the prevailing view that housing boosts the economy.
A testable implication of this augmented model is that countries that heavily
invest in housing should exhibit lower output per capita than countries that
invest less in housing.
The above finding is due to two reasons: (1) business and housing invest-
ments are rivals: an economy with higher residential capital has less business
capital left for production which would otherwise generate a positive return for
the economy, and (2) subsequently, when the output decreases because of the
aforementioned reason and we maintain the assumption of a constant saving
rate, less can be saved and reinvested in the capital stock. This is because the
saving curve will lie below a hypothetical saving curve of an otherwise iden-
tical economy with less residential and more business capital. In other words,
this augmented version of the Solow model does not assume that there is a sep-
arate saving function for housing capital, as Mankiw et al. (1992) do for human
capital, because of the aforementioned assumption of zero returns on housing.
Analogously, this model does not proceed as Mankiw et al. when they assume
that “the same production function applies to human capital, physical capital,
and consumption” (p. 416).
To test a version of this model empirically, chapter 6 departs from the above
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setup in a number of ways. First of all, I will transform the model in such a
way that it explains per-capita growth rates, not per-capita GDP levels. That
is, my tested model will become a dynamic one, which has the lagged value of
the dependent variable on the RHS and has thus to be analyzed with special
econometric methods. Also, while my empirical model will predict economic
growth based on homeownership, my empirical setup will allow for countries
to be off-steady-state: according to Solow’s theory, unless an economy is at its
steady state, per-capita growth rates must be different from zero. Therefore,
when positive per-capita growth rates can be observed, this may imply that my
sampled countries have experienced technological change and can therefore
achieve a higher steady state in the future. In other respects, I will rely on
Solow’s hypotheses that countries with higher saving rates and such with lower
population growth rates grow faster, and will also incorporate human capital
according to Mankiw et al. (1992). In essence, as these variables predict the path
towards a steady state, they also predict growth rates.
Second, I will relax the assumption of capital inputs insofar as homeown-
ership rates, not residential capital, are used to examine the impact of housing
investment on economic per capita growth. The reason is that my aim will be to
examine the relationship between growth and homeownership on the one hand
and growth and “non-homeownership” on the other. This distinction cannot be
made using residential investment or other real-estate-related variables. I will
use homeownership rates even though they cannot easily be accommodated
mathematically in the traditional Solow setup for the following reason: “rates”
cannot produce output, whereas capital can. Although the Solow model is more
intuitive when one uses capital inputs, in empirical applications it is standard
to augment the Solow model by additional control variables, which may not be
monetary, to safeguard against omitted variable bias. This is what chapter 6 will
do: next to the traditional Solow variables and additional, empirically tested
variables, homeownership will enter the empirical model to examine how it
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affects growth.
The third point of departure will be that the result derived in equation 2.31
only refutes the prevailing view that ever more housing leads to ever more
growth, while on the contrary, it can be observed in practice that homeown-
ership has positive external effects for an economy. This can, of course, not be
ignored. To picture this ambiguous relationship, I will allow for a hump-shaped
curve between homeownership rates and economic growth which assumes that
there is a positive relationship between the two up to a certain “optimal” point.
This is the critical homeownership rate which generates the highest economic
growth: it is above zero because of positive externalities, but well below 100
percent because of negative externalities that kick in when economies invest
excessively in homeownership, as could be witnessed during the housing cri-
sis. To empirically model this, homeownership rates will enter the regression
as a linear and a squared term to capture the inverse relationship with growth
starting at higher homeownership rates. Hence, I will analyze the constant
growth-trade-off induced by homeownership by letting homeownership gen-
erate positive “net” returns for the economy up to the critical homeownership
rate and negative “net” returns thereafter.
As opposed to the textbook Solow model, which assumes that the saving
rate is exogenous, my econometric estimation procedure will assume an en-
dogenous saving rate. Besides a very intuitive argument in favor of this pro-
cedure, it is also justified on the grounds that Caselli et al. (1996) advocate an
open economy version of the Solow model which assumes that the saving rate
is endogenous. Likewise, my empirical model will control for trade openness
and terms of trade, which turns my model economy into an open economy.
Lastly, it should be mentioned that my augmented model will not aim at
testing the validity of the Solow model by deriving a rate of convergence or
other implied values from the estimated coefficients. This is because histori-
cally, growth empiricists have come to very different conclusions concerning
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these values. Furthermore, the math behind the convergence rate requires that
the studied economies be very close to their steady state, which is highly un-
likely owing to the fact that I will study the years around the recent financial
crisis. I will instead focus on a number of tested and accepted control variables
to safeguard against omitted variable bias. Moreover, as was mentioned earlier,
the inclusion of “new” production factors into the Solow model necessarily al-
ters the mathematical expression of the growth coefficients, and hence, implied
values cannot be simply derived using “textbook coefficients” derived in other
papers. The goal of the following paper is instead to contribute to the housing
literature and to provide policy advice regarding the promotion of homeown-
ership in a country.
2.4 Appendix
A1: Speed of convergence
For better readability, tildes on the per-effective-unit-of-labor values are suppressed.
Assuming a Cobb–Douglas production function
Y = Kα(AL)1−α
Y
AL
= y = kα
with y =
Y
AL
and k =
K
AL
,
the fundamental equation of motion of the capital stock per effective unit of
labor is
k˙ = skα − (n + g + δ)k (2.32)
In the steady state, k˙ = 0 and therefore, skα∗ = (n + g + δ)k∗ so that
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k∗ =
[
s
n + g + δ
] 1
1−α
. (2.33)
Also because in the steady state, k˙ = 0, it follows that k˙k = 0:
k˙
k
= skα−1 − (n + g + δ) = G(k) = 0 (2.34)
We can now linearize G(k) in the direct vicinity of the steady state using a
Taylor approximation of first order and G(k∗) = 0:
G(k) ≈ G(k∗) + G′(k∗)(k− k∗)
≈ (α− 1)sk∗α−1−1(k− k∗)
≈ (α− 1)sk∗α−1
(
k− k∗
k∗
) (2.35)
Substituting equation 2.33 into 2.35 and simplifying leads to
G(k) ≈ (α− 1)s
[
s
n + g + δ
] α−1
1−α ( k− k∗
k∗
)
≈ (α− 1)s 1−α1−α s α−11−α
[
1
n + g + δ
] α−1
1−α ( k− k∗
k∗
)
≈ (α− 1)(n + g + δ) a−α1−α
(
k− k∗
k∗
)
≈ (α− 1)(n + g + δ)
(
k− k∗
k∗
)
We can further approximate ln k around k∗:
ln k ≈ ln k∗ + 1
k∗
(k− k∗)→ k− k
∗
k∗
= ln k− ln k∗
G(k) ≈ (α− 1)(n + g + δ)(ln k− ln k∗)
≈ (1− α)(n + g + δ)(ln k∗ − ln k)
Because y = kα → ln y = α ln k and d ln xdt = x˙x it follows that
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gy =
y˙
y
=
d ln y
dt
=
dα ln k
dt
= α
d ln k
dt
= α
k˙
k
= αG(k)
= α[(1− α)(n + g + δ)(ln k∗ − ln k)]
= (1− α)(n + g + δ)(α ln k∗ − α ln k)
= (1− α)(n + g + δ)(ln y∗ − ln y)
= λ(ln y∗ − ln y)
(2.36)
A2: Output per capita in the standard Solow model
Physical capital accumulation is governed by:
K˙ = sY− δK = dK(t)
dt
Let us compute log returns in order to make the model mathematically more
tractable:
d ln K(t)
dt
=
d ln K(t)
dt
· dK(t)
dt
1
K
· K˙ = K˙
K
Moreover, ln k = ln
( K
AL
)
= ln K− ln L− ln A and therefore, analogously,
d ln k(t)
dt
=
d ln K(t)
dt
− d ln L(t)
dt
− d ln A(t)
dt
k˙
k
=
K˙
K
− L˙
L
− A˙
A
(2.37)
From K˙ = sY− δK we get
K˙
K
= s
Y
K
− δ (2.38)
Inserting equation 2.38 in 2.37 yields
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k˙
k
= s
Y
K
− δ− L˙
L
− A˙
A
= s
Y
K
− δ− n− g,
or, equivalently
k˙ = sy− (n + g + δ)k
= sk(t)α − (n + g + δ)k(t).
(2.39)
In the steady state, k converges to a value where sk∗α = (n + g + δ)k∗, so
that
k∗α−1 =
n + g + δ
s
k∗α = α−1
√
n + g + δ
s
=
[
n + g + δ
s
] 1
α−1
=
[
s
n + g + δ
] 1
1−α
Note that dk
∗
ds > 0 and
dk∗
di < 0, i = n, g, δ.
Because k = KAL , y =
Y
AL = k
α and A(t) = A(0)egt, it follows that
y =
[
s
n + g + δ
] α
1−α
Y = A(t)L ·
[
s
n + g + δ
] α
1−α
Y
L
= A(t) ·
[
s
n + g + δ
] α
1−α
= A(0)egt ·
[
s
n + g + δ
] α
1−α
ln
(
Y
L
)
= ln A(0) + gt +
(
α
1− α
)
ln(s)−
(
α
1− α
)
ln(n + g + δ)
A3: Output per capita in the human-capital-augmented Solow model
We know that physical capital accumulation is governed by
K˙ = skY− δK → K˙K = sk
Y
K
− δ
or
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k˙ = sky− (n + g + δ)k (2.40)
Equivalently, human capital accumulation is governed by
H˙C = shcY− δHC → H˙CHC = shc
Y
K
− δ
or
h˙c = shcy− (n + g + δ)hc (2.41)
Because of
Y = KαHCβ(AL)1−α−β
y =
Y
AL
=
(
K
AL
)α (HC
AL
)β
= kαhcβ,
(2.42)
inserting equation 2.42 into equation 2.41 yields for h˙c = 0
shckαhcβ = (n + g + δ)hc
hcβ =
[
(n + g + δ)hc
shc
]
k−α
hcβ−1 =
[
n + g + δ
shc
]
k−α
hc∗ =
[
n + g + δ
shc
] 1
β−1
k−
α
β−1
=
[
shc
n + g + δ
] 1
1−β
k
α
1−β
(2.43)
Inserting equation 2.41 into equation 2.40 yields for k˙ = 0
2.4. APPENDIX 51
skkαhcβ = (n + g + δ)k
skkα
[
shc
n + g + δ
] β
1−β
k
αβ
1−β = (n + g + δ)k
kα−1
[
shc
n + g + δ
] β
1−β
k
αβ
1−β =
n + g + δ
sk
k
(α−1)(1−β)
1−β +
αβ
1−β =
[
sk
n + g + δ
]−1
·
[
shc
n + g + δ
]− β1−β
k
α+β−1
1−β =
[
sk
n + g + δ
]−1
·
[
shc
n + g + δ
]− β1−β
k∗ =
[
sk
n + g + δ
]− 1−β1−α−β [ shc
n + g + δ
](− β1−β )( 1−βα+β−1 )
=
[
sk
n + g + δ
] 1−β
1−α−β [ shc
n + g + δ
] β
1−α−β
(2.44)
Inserting equation 2.44 into equation 2.43 yields
h∗ =
[
shc
n + g + δ
] 1
1−β
( sk
n + g + δ
) 1−β
1−α−β ( shc
n + g + δ
) β
1−α−β
 α1−β
=
[
shc
n + g + δ
] 1−α
1−α−β [ sk
n + g + δ
] α
1−α−β
(2.45)
Inserting equations 2.44 and 2.45 in equation 2.42 leads to
y∗ = k∗αhc∗β
=
[
sk
n + g + δ
] α
1−α−β [ shc
n + g + δ
] β
1−α−β
(2.46)
Because k = KAL , y =
Y
AL , h =
HC
AL and A(t) = A(0)e
gt it follows that
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Y = y∗ · AL→ Y
L
=y∗ · A
Y
L
=
[
sk
n + g + δ
] α
1−α−β [ shc
n + g + δ
] β
1−α−β
A(0)egt
ln
(
Y
L
)
= ln A(0) + gt +
α
1− α− β (ln(sk)− ln(n + g + δ))
+
β
1− α− β (ln(shc)− ln(n + g + δ))
= ln A(0) + gt +
α+ β
1− α− β ln(n + g + δ)
+
α
1− α− β ln(sk) +
β
1− α− β ln(shc)
A4: A growth equation for off-steady-state dynamics
We know from equation 2.36 that
gy = λ ln y∗ − λ ln y
Substituting for b = λ ln y∗ and x = ln y leads to
x˙(t) = b− λx(t)
The general solution of such a non-homogeneous differential equation is
y = yc + yp where yc is the solution of a homogeneous differential equation
and yp is a particular integral, i.e., x = Ae−λt + ba . The definite solution of such
a differential equation is
x = x(0)e−λt +
b
λ
(1− e−λt).
Reinserting b = λ ln y∗ and x(t) = ln y(t) yields
ln y(t) = ln y(0)e−λt + ln y∗(1− e−λt)
ln y(t)− ln y(0) = ln y(0)e−λt + ln y∗(1− e−λt)− ln y(0)
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Now insert y∗ =
[
sk
n+g+δ
] α
1−α−β [ shc
n+g+δ
] β
1−α−β
and simplify:
ln y(t)− ln y(0) =(1− e−λt) α
1− α− β ln(sk) + (1− e
−λt)
β
1− α− β ln(shc)
− (1− e−λt) α+ β
1− α− β ln(n + g + δ)− (1− e
−λt) ln y(0)
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Chapter 3
Housing Markets in Germany,
the USA, Japan, and China
3.1 Introduction
Real estate is a special asset in the sense that it has political, cultural and eco-
nomic ramifications that go beyond a simple rate of return calculation for an
investment. For instance, real estate developers have historically triggered sig-
nificant change in our culture and way of life. A prominent example is William
Jaird Levitt who took advantage of the U.S. veterans’ need for affordable hous-
ing after WWII. A combination of high car ownership rates, housing subsidies,
and efficient construction methods allowed him to make the “suburban” real es-
tate innovation where similar cookie-cut style houses using assembly-line type
techniques led to substantial savings. These real estate developments and the
suburban living style were exported to other countries such as the case of the
“Neubau” neighborhoods in Germany.
Nevertheless, housing markets around the world vary greatly as regards
their differing political, economic, and social backgrounds. To give an overview
of some of these differences, this paper presents stylized facts on real estate mar-
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kets in Germany, the USA, Japan, and China. It discusses cultural and societal
aspects, taxation and regulation as well as the resulting incentives.
3.2 Germany
Germany ranks among the countries with the lowest homeownership rates in
the industrialized world (roughly 45 percent). One reason may be the tax treat-
ment of homeownership: contrary to other industrialized countries, the Ger-
man tax system does not favor owning over renting. For instance, the largest
government subsidy to homeownership (Eigenheimzulage) was discontinued in
2005. Moreover, mortgage payments are only tax-deductible if the home is
rented out, but not if the house is owner-occupied. Still, mortgage interest rates
in Germany have been among the lowest in Europe (European Mortgage Fed-
eration, 2016). Therefore, financing costs may not necessarily be a deterring
factor. According to Voigtla¨nder (2009), other reasons for Germanys low home-
ownership rate may be its sophisticated and renter-friendly rental market, no
or little rent control and accompanying market distortions, and historically sta-
ble house prices. Because Germans tend to be renters rather than owners, it has
been argued that the housing crisis had little effect on the German economy
(Kofner, 2014).
But despite long periods of low and stable house and rent prices, some Ger-
man cities have seen soaring prices in the past few years. Particularly in some
distressed housing markets, owning has become more and more unaffordable,
which is why new approaches to facilitating the purchase of homes are being
discussed by the government. Furthermore, rent control (Mietpreisbremse) was
introduced in 2015 which links rent prices in certain cities to the local rent in-
dex. However, this regulation has not been proven to be successful in practice
(Deschermeier et al., 2017).
In Germany the landlord has to provide a confirmation of provision of res-
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idence (Wohnungsgeberbesta¨tigung) to a tenant. This form is used together with
an application for residency with a city hall. The landlord may be fined up to
e50,000 for filing a fictitious confirmation of provision of residence and the re-
quirement must be met in order to avoid a fine of up to e1,000. Without this
document, a municipality administrative unit will not issue a registration cer-
tificate which is needed for enrolling children at the local schools, getting an ID
card or a drivers’ license.
Upon purchase of a property, a transfer tax fee has to be paid. These tax
rates are determined by the German federal states and can be up to 6.5 percent
of the property value. However, rates as low as 3.5 percent can be found in two
of the 16 states. Yet, this tax rate is relatively high compared to the U.S., where
it is only a fraction of the German rate.
When capital gains, e.g., on the sale of a home, are realized, there is a spec-
ulation tax (Spekulationssteuer). Practically, capital gains from selling privately
held real estate after a holding period of up to ten years is considered spec-
ulation and fully taxed. However, there is an exception for houses that were
owner-occupied for a period of at least three years before the sale of the house.
This provides an incentive for Germans to hold to the same real estate for a
longer period of time. The same speculation-tax logic applies to family home
inheritances, which may be inherited free from tax as long as the heirs move
into that house and live there for at least 10 years. Furthermore, houses can be
inherited tax-free as long as the value of the entire inheritance does not exceed
e400,000.
3.3 USA
Contrary to Germany, U.S. Americans are not legally required to establish res-
idency that effectively ties them to a dwelling for most economic purposes ex-
cept for access to public schools. This is because public schooling is primarily
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financed by local real estate taxes. Therefore, effectively one needs to reside
in an area where one wants to send children to public schools. Because tax
revenue spent on schooling is substantially higher in “good’ neighborhoods,
families have an incentive to buy property in these areas and maintain their
neighborhoods. As a consequence, house prices increase, which in turn raises
the levied taxes which finance public schools. With increasing house prices,
however, consumption spending may increase too, as many homeowners use
their homes as a collateral against which they borrow (Benjamin and Chinloy,
2008).
Owning a home doesn’t prevent Americans from moving. Between 2015
and 2016, more than 10.3 million homeowners moved, representing 29.42 per-
cent of all those who relocated during that time (U.S. Census Bureau, 2016).
Therefore, they sell their homes relatively often, and sales gains proceeding
from these trades are fully taxed. However, there is a home sale exclusion which
makes home sale profits tax-exempt when a specific exclusion amount, which
is $500,000 for married couples and $250,000 for singles, is not exceeded. For
sellers of investment property, there is an exception when the entire proceeds
of the sale are reinvested in a more expensive property. The incentive effect of
this real estate tax is that Americans increase the wealth that is tied in housing.
To avoid inheritance tax, a common method of ownership of a family house
is joint tenancy. Under this form of ownership, the surviving spouse automati-
cally receives free title to the house without having to pay inheritance taxes or
to share the inheritance with the other survivors. This provides an incentive for
accumulating housing wealth instead of financial wealth.
Moreover, the U.S. tax code does not tax imputed rents on owner-occupied
houses but allows mortgage payments and real estate taxes to be deducted from
the federal income tax. Thus, in effect, owning is subsidized at least twice.
In their analysis of the U.S. tax code, Hendershott and Hu (1981, 1983) show
that the housing tax subsidy decreases the user cost of residential capital below
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that of non-residential capital, which provides an incentive to (over)invest in
housing.
3.4 Japan
In Japan, land is extremely expensive. Noguchi (1994), for instance, reports that
a square meter of land in Tokyo in the 1980s cost around £4 million—forty times
as much as a square meter in a comparable location in the inner city of London
(£100,000 million). Moreover, Knoll et al. (2017) estimate that between 1890 and
1990, the average share of land in Japan’s house values increased from 40 to
90 percent, while the shares for Germany and the USA have been much lower
(between 13 and 40 percent). Noguchi (1994) points out that in large Japanese
cities and suburban sites of Tokyo and Osaka, the land purchase cost could be
up to 98.5 percent of the housing cost.
Despite the immense cost, the majority of Japanese are homeowners (Mori,
1998). One explanation may be speculation. Land in Japan is so valuable
that “all landowners, even in the remote country (...) may hope one day that
their land will be demanded for development, especially when the economy is
booming” (Mori, 1998, p. 1545). Hirayama (2010) attributes this to the aging
population in Japan, which is being faced with the need to cut back on social
spending and is encouraged to acquire property to maintain economic security.
Hirayama (2010) also reports that one third of Japanese expect to inherit
real estate. This is very attractive in light of the aforementioned demographic
change. To facilitate the accumulation of wealth, inheritance taxes are substan-
tially decreased when residential property is bequeathed. Furthermore, prop-
erty taxes are relatively low and are even decreased by one fourth for small
residential sites. A lower tax burden and high land prices create an incentive to
acquire rather small plots of land.
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3.5 China
China has a distinct and complex household registration system (hukou),
which classifies every Chinese as either “rural/agricultural” or “urban/non-
agricultural” and ascribes a permanent residence based on the parent’s hukou
classification. This system was introduced in order to regulate and restrict la-
bor mobility towards big cities when China started to become urbanized. Rural
workers wanting to move to cities had to send an application to the govern-
ment. When denied legal migration, many Chinese workers moved to cities
illegally and were then excluded from most welfare benefits (access to urban
housing and schooling, insurance, etc.) to which only legal migrants were enti-
tled. Nowadays—even though the hukou system still exists—Chinese workers
are said to be free to move to any place in China (Song, 2014).
Usually, a person with rural hukou is automatically allocated a piece of land
in the area of residence (Song, 2014). However, ownership of that land is not
permitted. Instead, land is leased from the government and the maximum land-
use rights transfer is for 70 years in the case of residential real estate (Li and
Huang, 2006). A year prior to the expiration of the 70-year land lease period
a homeowner may apply for lease renewal or return the land and the house to
the government without receiving compensation for the value of the residential
property. The application is costly and may be rejected at the governments
discretion. This event is unlikely and is an extreme outcome which is a source
of worry for Chinese homeowners. On top of that, the 2007 property law did
not explicitly describe the procedure for such an application. Therefore, just
recently, the Chinese government announced the draft of a provision which
would allow land leasers to unconditionally renew their lease contract after 70
years (Hsu, 2017).
Because homeowners don’t own the the land on which the home is built,
it is difficult to accumulate wealth. Therefore, especially closer to larger cities,
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individuals with land-use rights have an incentive to build multi-story houses
on their lots and rent out the dwellings to (illegal) migrants who work in the
close-by cities and are denied access to urban housing (Li and Huang, 2006).
3.6 Conclusion
This paper contrasted housing markets in Germany, the USA, Japan, and
China—countries whose markets vary greatly as regards their political, soci-
etal, and cultural backgrounds. While individuals in the U.S. are free to move
anywhere they desire, Chinese farmers are only granted 70-year land-use rights
with the prospect of losing their home after the lease ends. Germany, as Japan,
is an aging society whose public pension system will face challenges in the fu-
ture; yet only the minority of Germans own a home. The regulatory, political
and institutional differences shaping these markets are of course not exhaus-
tive; yet, it was the aim of this paper to show how diverse housing markets
around the world can be.
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Chapter 4
Excess Homeownership:
Consumption, Wealth Effects and
Distortions
4.1 Introduction
Should governments encourage homeownership? Case et al. (2005) use a novel
metric to show that housing wealth has a positive effect on consumption. This
metric has several advantages over similar variables that have been used by
other researchers (see Calomiris et al., 2009). In particular, it more accurately
reflects housing wealth as it is based on actual house prices and the number of
owner-occupied houses in an economy. It does therefore not rely on housing
wealth as a residual measure of total wealth net of stock wealth and, conse-
quently, reduces the risk that the results are driven by measurement problems.
However, previous studies have typically ignored mortgage debt. This may
generate misleading results, as it has been shown that households typically
finance consumption with debt (Benjamin and Chinloy, 2008), i.e., when the
value of their homes increases, they borrow in order to consume. This could
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lead to a lower net housing wealth when debt increases more strongly than
house prices, and omitting this variable would misstate the housing wealth
effect. Bostic et al. (2009), for instance, compute net-of-debt housing wealth,
whereas many other studies typically consider gross-of-debt housing wealth.
When net household wealth is used to explain consumption behavior, Bostic
et al. find that the housing wealth effect becomes less conclusive than when
gross housing wealth is used as a regressor.
Yet, the study by Case et al., as many other studies on the housing wealth
effect, are subject to severe endogeneity bias, which are discussed in detail by
Calomiris et al. (2009): first, Case et al. regress levels of consumption on levels
of income, which are both non-stationary. By this, they violate an important
requirement for the validity of OLS. And second, they use current changes in
income and housing wealth to explain current changes in consumption. But
because current changes in income do not capture permanent income shocks,
it is highly likely that the error term correlates with housing wealth: house-
holds that expect permanent income growth may well bid up house prices and
thereby raise their housing wealth. In fact, after correcting for endogeneity bias,
Calomiris et al. (2009) report that the large wealth effect found by Case et al.
vanishes.
We also examine the implications of housing wealth for the economy. One
may hypothesize that homeowners are more likely to purchase furniture and
spend on remodeling related goods as well as local amenities, particularly when
they have more equity in their house. That additional consumption then may
drive production, leading to an increase in GDP. The policy implication is that
the government should encourage homeownership on the grounds that it may
contribute to growth. In fact, the debt-tax shield of home mortgages may be
viewed as a subsidy that encourages homeownership in the USA. However, as
studies by Mills (1987, 1989) and Hendershott (1989) have shown, too much in-
vestment in housing may have detrimental effects for the economy. Therefore,
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housing may also lead to a decrease in GDP when there is housing overinvest-
ment.
Consequently, we run our regressions on two subsamples which we distin-
guish by the median U.S. homeownership rate. We do this because there is ev-
idence that (1) homeowner communities have an impact on investment in, and
consumption of, local amenities and that (2) overinvestment in housing may
have adverse effects on economic growth. We therefore condition our analyses
on two mutually exclusive subsamples to study how the relationship between
housing on the one hand and consumption and GDP on the other differ. Our
results indicate that housing wealth has no impact on consumption and GDP
in low-homeownership states. However, more housing wealth increases con-
sumption in high-homeownership states but depresses GDP. We attribute the
findings for the high-homeownership group to the fact that on the one hand,
homeowners invest in local amenities to develop social capital, but that on the
other hand, overinvestment in housing leads to underinvestment in other busi-
ness activity with higher social returns to capital.
This paper contributes to the housing wealth literature in three ways. First,
we correct for endogeneity bias by instrumenting changes in the explanatory
variables by their lags, which has not been done across the board in past stud-
ies. Second, when we study consumption behavior, we additionally control for
mortgage debt at the household level as an increase in housing wealth is likely
accompanied by a rise in household debt. And third, we base our analysis of
consumption and GDP on two subsamples defined by high vs. low average
homeownership.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section re-
views the theoretical and empirical literature on the housing wealth effect and
the impact of housing on production. That section is followed by the empirical
analysis which focuses on consumption as well as GDP per capita across the
U.S. states. Section 4.5 briefly summarizes the findings and concludes.
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4.2 Related literature
4.2.1 The housing wealth effect
There is an extensive literature on the effect of different types of wealth on con-
sumption. Case et al. (2005), for instance, find that changes in housing wealth
have a much larger effect on consumption than do changes in financial wealth;
both in cross-country and U.S. states panels. In fact, there is a consensus in the
literature that the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) from housing wealth
is larger than the MPC from financial wealth. The theoretical foundation for
this finding is the permanent income hypothesis (e.g., Lettau and Ludvigson,
2004), which claims that consumption is only affected by permanent, not tran-
sitory, wealth shocks.
Yet, empirically and theoretically, the positive housing wealth effect has
not been confirmed across the board. Skinner (1989), for instance, argues that
homeowners with a bequest motive consume less. This effect is especially pro-
nounced when house prices increase a lot and the homeowners’ heirs have to
spend more to buy a house. Hence, in this case, a negative housing wealth effect
seems plausible.
Engelhardt (1996) finds an asymmetric effect of housing wealth on con-
sumption: increasing housing wealth has no effect whereas a drop in housing
wealth is associated with a fall in consumption.
Sinai and Souleles (2005) argue that rising house prices simultaneously in-
crease future housing costs, and consequently, the housing wealth effect should
at best be small. Also, they note that in studies using aggregate data, the hous-
ing effect is usually smaller than when micro data are used, because someone’s
gains are someone else’s losses when houses are traded. The latter argument
has also been presented by Buiter (2010).
Lastly, it is important to account for household debt. Benjamin and Chinloy
(2008) report that consumption is increasing in the mortgage balance, thereby
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providing evidence for the hypothesis that households use housing wealth to
smooth their consumption. This is because when house prices rise, the house-
hold increases its mortgage balance in order to consume more. This may leave
the household’s net wealth unaffected.
4.2.2 Housing overinvestment
How could housing investment affect the economy? Across countries world-
wide, productivity levels differ. This difference in wealth may, for instance,
be due to historical or political developments. Discrepancies in GDP may also
arise because of differences in production technologies and efficiency. That is,
there may be countries that predominantly invest in productive assets whereas
other economies rather focus on assets that are comparatively less productive.
Hendershott and Hu, among others, studied this phenomenon extensively in
the 1980s for the U.S. market. They find that unanticipated inflation reduces
the real user cost of housing. This depresses stock prices and thereby increases
the real user cost of corporate capital, which leads to a misallocation of capital
(Hendershott and Hu, 1981).
Hendershott and Hu (1983) point out that the economic growth and capital–
labor ratio in the U.S. of the 1970s diminished compared to previous decades.
They build a two-sector economy with a housing and a non-housing good and
find a misallocation of capital towards residential uses because the real user
cost of housing was lower than the real user cost of corporate capital. This
underinvestment in the business sector was caused by the U.S. tax code (1966–
1978) and depressed the capital-labor ratio, which harmed the economy. In
a similar vein, Rosen (1979) estimates that the U.S. productivity would have
gained $107 per household if the housing tax subsidy was eliminated.
Mills (1987) also finds that the U.S. has overinvested in housing relative to
industrial capital, but that there is no difference between owner-occupied and
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rented housing. He determines the social returns to the two types of capital
and finds that the return to housing capital is about half that to non-housing
capital. This result is broadly confirmed by Mills (1989) and Hendershott (1989)
and implies that investment in residential uses yields a lower output than does
non-residential investment.
4.3 Research design
4.3.1 Data
We use data at the state level to study how per-capita consumption and GDP
responded to housing wealth, constructed following Case et al. (2005), across
U.S. states between 2004 and 2015. It would make sense to subtract mortgage
debt from housing wealth to study the effect of an increase in actual net wealth
on consumption; but because the housing wealth variable is an index rather
than a dollar figure, we separately control for the level of household mortgage
debt.
The mortgage debt data was sourced from the Federal Reserve Bank New
York, while the remaining variables were retrieved from the FRED database.
All values are in constant 2010 dollars and per-capita terms.
The use of state-level data guarantees that the data collection process as well
as the definition of the variables across states are consistent, and we can thereby
safeguard against measurement problems that may arise in cross-country sam-
ples. Moreover, as Calomiris et al. (2009) have noted, panel data—as opposed
to time-series data—increases the number of observations and the power of the
empirical tests.
Table 4.1 reports summary statistics of the full U.S. states sample and the
two subsamples, which have been divided according to the median U.S. home-
ownership rate of 69.60 percent. A two-sample t test was conducted to test
whether the two subsample averages differ significantly from each other. The
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test has been run on all subsample averages and was highly significant in all
cases. This means that households in states where there is high homeownership
have a lower per-capita GDP and income. On top of that, they have lower con-
sumption levels even though their gross housing wealth is significantly higher.
4.3.2 Method
Typically, consumption and income are non-stationary, which is why we use
changes in these variables instead of their levels. On top of that, we also ad-
dress the problem of endogeneity: when current changes in consumption are
regressed on contemporaneous changes in income, expected changes in future,
permanent, income may end up in the error term. This induces endogeneity be-
cause the error term may be correlated with housing wealth as, when expected
incomes rise, households may bid up house prices, which is then reflected in
rising housing wealth (Calomiris et al., 2009). To overcome this bias, we instru-
ment the changes in the independent variables with their lags. In order not to
lose too many years of data, we include up to the third lag of the independent
variables.
We distinguish between states with excess homeownership rates (above or
equal to the median of 69.60 percent) and states with low to intermediate home-
ownership levels (below the median). With this procedure, we would like to
understand how consumption behavior across households in neighborhoods
with high homeownership differs from those with lower homeownership. Also,
since overinvestment in housing may harm the economy, we examine if GDP
at the state level varies with homeownership.
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Table 4.1: Summary statistics.
Full sample Low-homeownership subsample High-homeownership subsample
Variable Obs. Mean SD Min. Max. Mean SD Min. Max. Mean SD Min. Max.
Homeownership rate 612 68.51 6.05 40.40 81.30 64.21 5.71 40.40 69.50 72.71 2.21 69.60 81.30
Consumption 612 33787.65 4923.70 24732.16 50827.97 34981.41 5210.63 25737.71 50827.97 32624.69 4328.88 24732.16 43534.50
Log consumption 612 10.42 0.14 10.12 10.84 10.45 0.14 10.16 10.84 10.38 0.13 10.12 10.68
GDP 612 51403.37 19531.69 32106.54 177844.90 56313.57 25203.44 33898.05 177844.90 46619.9 9436.33 32106.54 87125.09
Log GDP 612 10.8 0.26 10.38 12.09 10.88 0.29 10.43 12.09 10.73 0.19 10.38 11.38
Housing wealth 612 0.28 0.05 0.16 0.49 0.25 0.04 0.16 0.49 0.30 0.04 0.20 0.49
Log housing wealth 612 -1.30 0.17 -1.82 -0.71 -1.38 0.16 -1.82 -0.72 -1.22 0.13 -1.59 -0.71
Income 612 40822.68 7070.37 28932.12 68163.76 42904.23 7327.22 30947.82 68163.76 38794.84 6179.77 28932.12 62126
Log income 612 10.60 0.16 10.27 11.13 10.65 0.16 10.34 11.13 10.55 0.15 10.27 11.04
Mortgage debt 612 31244.88 11563.55 10719.07 73698.60 34325.91 12538.54 15042.71 73698.60 28243.37 9640.62 10719.07 58628.72
Log mortgage debt 612 10.28 0.37 9.28 11.21 10.38 0.37 9.62 11.21 10.19 0.34 9.28 10.98
Building permits 612 1621.38 2503.63 11.00 20176.00 1952.54 2878.15 11.00 17836.00 1298.76 2028.16 38.00 20176.00
Log building permits 612 -8.48 0.69 -10.87 -6.51 -8.51 0.69 -10.87 -6.51 -8.45 0.69 -10.33 -6.76
Unemployment rate 612 6.82 2.17 2.50 14.40 7.22 2.20 2.50 13.90 6.44 2.08 2.70 14.40
Log unempl. rate 612 1.87 0.32 0.92 2.67 1.93 0.31 0.92 2.63 1.81 0.31 0.99 2.67
Population (in 1,000) 612 6028.55 6754.07 509.11 39000.00 7503.32 8581.55 567.14 3900.00 4591.84 3777.37 509.11 18700.00
Log population 612 15.11 1.03 13.14 17.48 15.24 1.14 13.25 17.48 14.98 0.90 13.14 16.74
Note: All dollar values are expressed in real per-capita terms. The two subsamples are divided according to the median homeownership rate, which is 69.60 percent.
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Our housing wealth variable is constructed according to Case et al. (2005)
as follows:
Vit = RitNit Iit, (4.1)
where Vit is the aggregate (owner-occupied) housing wealth, Rit is the
homeownership rate, Nit is the number of households and Iit is a real house
price index (in state i and year t for all the aforementioned variables).
4.4 Results
4.4.1 Regressions of consumption
Regression (1) in table 4.2 shows consumption as a function of housing wealth
computed according to Case et al. (2005) as well as mortgage debt and income
from 2005 to 2014. In this regression, we deliberately do not try to reduce endo-
geneity. As a result, we can confirm the housing wealth effect on consumption
that has been found in many previous studies, as our estimated elasticity is sig-
nificant and large. However, the coefficient on income is unrealistically low, as
according to Campbell and Mankiw (1990), it should be in the range 0.3–0.7.
Moreover, mortgage debt has a negative sign. This stands in contrast with, e.g.,
Benjamin and Chinloy (2008), who find that consumption increases in mortgage
debt when credit constrained households borrow to consume. These results
hold true also when we analyze subsamples in columns (2) and (3) of the same
table.
The coefficients in table 4.2 are a consequence of endogeneity bias induced
by using endogenous explanatory variables, as discussed by Calomiris et al.
(2009). Therefore, in a next step, endogeneity will be reduced by instrumenting
the endogenous independent variables with up to their third lags.
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Table 4.2: Fixed effects regression of changes in consumption.
(1) Full sample (2) Low (3) High
Housing wealth 0.1352*** 0.1382*** 0.1269***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Mortgage debt -0.1777*** -0.1922*** -0.1497***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Income 0.0599** 0.0647** 0.0451
(0.020) (0.044) (0.307)
Constant 0.0080 0.0088 0.0065
Note: p-values in parentheses. ***, **, and * refer to signifi-
cance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. All constants
are significant at the 1% level. The dependent variable is dif-
ferences in log consumption. The independent variables are
log differences lagged by one period, which does not correct
for endogeneity issues. All values are in per-capita terms.
We decided to omit state-fixed effects for two reasons. First and foremost,
the number of regressors becomes too large compared to the number of obser-
vations. Because we use 2SLS, which has no built-in fixed effects option, every
state enters the regression with its own dummy variable, which uses up degrees
of freedom. Second, the state dummies turned out to be mostly insignificant.
This could be the case because once we subdivide our sample into subgroups
based on their homeownership rate relative to the median, it is likely that a lot
of state-specific heterogeneity is lost when placing them in two buckets with
likely similar within-groups characteristics.
Column (1) in table 4.3 shows that, once endogeneity is corrected for and the
whole dataset is used, the housing wealth effect vanishes when mortgages and
income are kept constant: the effect is almost zero and insignificant. The mort-
gage variable, by contrast, has a positive sign and is significant. Households
seem to increase their mortgage debt in order to consume, which confirms the
results found by Benjamin and Chinloy (2008). The coefficient on income is sig-
nificant and positive and in the typical 0.3–0.7 range as postulated by Campbell
and Mankiw (1990).
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Table 4.3: IV regression of changes in consumption.
(1) Full sample (2) Low (3) High
Housing wealth -0.0080 0.0031 0.1757**
(0.759) (0.902) (0.034)
Mortgage debt 0.0725** 0.1263*** -0.2916**
(0.016) (0.000) (0.050)
Income 0.5075*** 0.3095*** 0.0040
(0.000) (0.002) (0.986)
Constant 0.0133 0.0171 0.0219
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Note: p-values in parentheses. ***, **, and * refer to signifi-
cance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. All constants
are significant at the 1% level. The dependent variable is
differences in log consumption. The independent variables
are instrumented by log differences up to their third lag. All
values are in per-capita terms.
When we concentrate on households in low-homeownership states, the
above result is largely confirmed. These results are documented in column (2)
of table 4.3. The income coefficient has a plausible size and the mortgage coef-
ficient is positive and significant. But again, there is no housing wealth effect.
One explanation for the result that increases in housing wealth exert no effect
on consumption is that consumption may be mainly financed by household in-
come. This is justified on the grounds that in the low-homeownership sample,
incomes are significantly higher on average than in the upper half of the dis-
tribution. Again, the coefficient on income lies in the 0.3–0.7 range found by
Campbell and Mankiw (1990).
According to some studies, a non-existing housing wealth effect is not im-
plausible. With a representative-agents model, Buiter (2010) argues that when
house prices increase, there is only a redistributive effect of wealth from those
long housing (i.e., those who expect to decrease their housing services, e.g., the
elderly) towards those short housing (i.e., those who expect to increase their
housing services, e.g., younger households), as the marginal propensities to
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consume across those two groups are the same: when homes are traded be-
tween two households, someone’s losses are simply someone else’s gains. The
theoretical model by Sinai and Souleles (2005) confirms this idea. Alternatively,
the authors point out that an increase in house prices simultaneously increases
housing liabilities and therefore, the housing wealth effect should at best be
small. Furthermore, households with a bequest motive may decide to consume
less from their housing wealth (Skinner, 1989).
Lastly, we focus on households in high-homeownership states. Interest-
ingly, in that subsample, the housing wealth effect becomes positive and sig-
nificant whereas the effect of income on consumption completely disappears.
This large housing wealth effect could be explained in light of social benefits of
homeownership: in this subsample, the homeownership rate is above-average
and neighborhoods are therefore predominantly characterized by homeowners
rather than renters. That is, social benefits of homeownership may play a dom-
inant role in this subsample. Various studies (e.g., DiPasquale and Glaeser,
1999; Engelhardt et al., 2010) confirm that homeowners invest more in local
amenities and home improvements in order to maintain their neighborhoods.
Therefore, the housing wealth effect in these areas might be larger and signif-
icant. However, this explanation should be treated with caution, as housing
wealth is a function of house prices, which in turn is a function of investments
in local amenities and improvements, rendering house prices possibly endoge-
nous.
Moreover, when income and housing wealth are controlled for, an increase
in mortgage debt decreases consumption. The short-run effect of a rise in house
prices may be that consumption is expanded; however, households cannot con-
sume their housing equity indefinitely. At some point in time, this additional
debt has to be paid off. Therefore, the above result points to the possibility that
homeowners who have borrowed heavily against their housing equity in the
past are eventually inclined to pay off their debt.
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4.4.2 Regressions of GDP
Table 4.4: IV regression of changes in GDP.
(1) Full sample (2) Low (3) High
Housing wealth -0.1254 0.1085 -0.2673*
(0.361) (0.446) (0.053)
Real income 1.4644** 0.9790** 1.0800*
(0.016) (0.033) (0.061)
Building permits -0.0296*** -0.0208** -0.0318***
(0.003) (0.050) (0.006)
Unemployment rate -0.0053* -0.0037 -0.0069
(0.090) (0.306) (0.113)
Population growth -0.5042 -0.9530** -0.5724
(0.234) (0.043) (0.276)
Constant -0.0362* -0.0254* -0.0142
(0.051) (0.088) (0.483)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Note: p-values in parentheses. ***, **, and * refer to signifi-
cance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The dependent
variable is differences in log consumption. Housing wealth and
mortgages are instrumented by log differences up to their third
lag. All values except the population growth and unemploy-
ment rates are in per-capita terms.
Consumption is included in the calculation of GDP. If housing capital affects
consumption, then one may conclude that it affects GDP. Therefore, in table 4.4
we analyze GDP growth at the U.S. states level as a function of housing wealth.
Moreover, we follow Miller et al. (2011) and include income, the number of
building permits, unemployment, and population growth as control variables.
Again, all variables are log differences and instrumented as in the previous
section.
The results for the full sample are presented in column (1). We find that
the coefficients on income, unemployment and population growth have the ex-
pected signs; however, the latter is insignificant. The number of building per-
mits depresses GDP growth significantly. However, there is no offsetting posi-
tive effect of housing wealth on GDP growth in the full sample; the coefficient
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is negative and insignificant. To further investigate this result, we again divide
our sample in states with homeownership rates lower than or higher than the
median homeownership and report the results in columns (2) and (3) of table
4.4.
We find that there is no significant reduction in GDP associated with hous-
ing wealth in states that do not overinvest in homeownership (column (2)).
However, there is a relatively large and significant reduction in GDP growth
in states with excess homeownership (column (3)). In both cases, the number
of building permits is held constant. Our intuition for this result is that ex-
cess homeownership causes individuals to underinvest in other economic activ-
ity. The reason may be overinvestment in housing construction and housing-
related consumption, as was shown in column (3) of table 4.3. In addition,
the fact that building permits have a more detrimental effect on GDP growth
in high- than in low-homeownership states can be seen as further evidence
for our hypothesis, since an additional housing unit in states where there is
already high homeownership may harm economic growth. We interpret this
result as a broad confirmation of Mills (1987), who reports that a dollar invest-
ment in residential capital yields only half the return of a dollar investment in
non-residential capital. Therefore, too much homeownership may have adverse
effects on the economy. This overinvestment in housing may be induced by an
economic distortion caused by the mortgage debt tax shield (Hendershott and
Hu, 1981, 1983).
4.5 Conclusion
Most studies of the housing wealth effect have found a positive impact of hous-
ing wealth and consumption. However, there is reason to believe that these re-
sults may be subject to endogeneity issues (Calomiris et al., 2009). We therefore
re-examined the housing wealth effect in the U.S. states but ran IV regressions
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in order to safeguard against endogeneity bias.
Furthermore, we argued that housing wealth as it is computed by, e.g., Case
et al. (2005) may not be real wealth because homeownership usually involves
high levels of debt. That is, when mortgage debt increases, house prices are not
a good measure of housing wealth. For example, if the mortgage debt more
than doubles while house prices only double, then Case et al.’s measure would
inaccurately indicate an increase in housing wealth. We therefore studied how
capital tied up in housing affects consumption while explicitly controlling for
mortgage debt.
Lastly, we studied the implications of housing wealth conditional on high
vs. low homeownership rates for both consumption and economic growth.
That is, we analyzed two mutually exclusive subsets of states separately which
we based on the upper and lower half of the homeownership distribution.
Our results indicate that in the whole sample and the low-homeownership
subsample, there is no housing wealth effect on consumption. However, in
states with high levels of homeownership, consumption increases with housing
wealth. We attribute this to the existence of social benefits to homeownership,
which give households an incentive to spend on local amenities. Moreover, we
find that in these same high-homeownership states, there is a significant and
negative effect of housing wealth on GDP, which is not present in states with
lower rates. We see this as a confirmation of the research conducted by Mills
(1987, 1989) and Hendershott (1989), who showed that the social return to hous-
ing capital is considerably lower than that to non-housing capital. Households
in states with many neighboring homeowners spend more on local amenities
and thereby underinvest in other business activity. This is also a consequence of
the U.S. tax code, which subsidizes homeownership and may create economic
distortions (Hendershott and Hu, 1981, 1983). We therefore conclude that the
answer to the question whether governments should encourage homeowner-
ship is “it depends”: even though homeownership may fuel consumption, this
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does not necessarily translate into an increase in GDP—especially not when
there is already overinvestment in housing.
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Chapter 5
Home is where the Health is:
Housing and Adult Height from
the Late 19th to the Mid-20th
Centuries
5.1 Introduction
Health, which is a crucial component of welfare, is heavily influenced by a per-
son’s exposure to disease environment and sanitation in the early years of life,
and was especially so during the 19th and early 20th centuries when knowledge
about hygiene and disease was not widespread. However, little attention has
been paid to the possible relationship between housing—as being an important
part of someone’s environment—and that person’s health between 1870 and
1965. This paper argues that sanitation and better living standards, and thus the
ability to mitigate health hazards, are reflected in the quality of housing which
a person enjoys over their lifetime. The quality of housing can be proxied by
the value of a home, which was recently confirmed by Eichholtz et al. (2017)
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who constructed rental price indices for seven major European cities over the
past 500 years. They concluded that most of the house price increases were due
to improved housing quality—which includes, for instance, heating, access to
water and sewers—rather than to rising market values or local monopoly be-
havior of landlords. At the same time, average human height has increased
as well in some of the decades and countries under study, giving rise to this
paper’s research question.
On the one hand, we would expect higher housing prices to reduce real in-
come, ceteris paribus, and the quality of nutrition and health spending. On the
other hand, better and healthier housing required investments that were paid
via the rent or house prices. It is an empirical question which of the two influ-
enced health stronger. This paper hypothesizes that rising house prices, inter-
preted as house quality improvements, led to taller final adult heights during
the period between 1870 and 1965. A more expensive house may be healthier
than a less expensive one. This decreases the density of people per room or
house, which lowers the risk of the spread of infectious diseases such as diar-
rhea or tuberculosis. Moreover, expensive houses feature better sanitary facili-
ties than houses of lower value, as demonstrated by Eichholtz et al.. Therefore,
this paper hypothesizes that less crowding and better sanitary standards such
as clean bathrooms, access to water, and wastewater disposal that have been
established over the past two centuries have contributed to the real house price
increases in some countries, which are depicted in figure 5.1, whereas in other
countries, housing prices did not rise much before the 1960s. Improvements in
disease environment due to housing could have led to better health and there-
fore rising adult heights.
So far, no study has interpreted house prices as an indicator of the quality
of housing and potential disease environments to study this relationship. But
it has been criticized that studies on human stature had frequently omitted the
cost of housing, which likely led to an overestimation of the influence of income
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Figure 5.1: Historical real house prices, 1870–1965 (1990=100).
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Note: The curve representing average house prices is based on available
data and therefore does not include all countries at all times. Data
sources: Jorda` et al. (2017); Knoll et al. (2017)
(Komlos, 1998) or food consumption (Margo and Steckel, 1983) on adult height.
The purpose of this paper is therefore to shed light on the relationship between
housing quality and human stature while controlling for several well-known
determinants of height. To this end, this study uses real house price and height
data for a sample of 14 countries over the years 1870 to 1965. We end the period
in 1965 because thereafter, a strong an monotonous upward trend sets in, which
reduces the possibility to clearly identify height determinants, as their might be
unit root problems. Moreover, it has been argued that height gradually loses its
health indicator function because even lower income strata could afford a good
condition of health.
The next section will expand on the causal relationship between housing
and health as well as on historical developments in this area. That section
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will also motivate the empirical research. Section 5.3 will discuss the data and
methodology used to analyze the research question before section 5.4 will even-
tually provide answers and discussions. Section 5.5 concludes.
5.2 Literature review on housing and health
Because there is no widely accepted, unambiguous indicator of public health
that was recorded for all countries for the time before the 1950s, adult height can
be drawn upon as a proxy for the biological standard of living since much of it
is determined by nutrition and diseases that the person experienced during the
first three years of childhood (Margo and Steckel, 1983; Case and Paxson, 2008).
Amongst others, height is positively related with labor market outcomes and
is thus an indicator of welfare and human development (Strauss and Thomas,
1998; Deaton, 2003; Case and Paxson, 2008; Steckel, 2009).
Hence, height potential is strongly correlated with one’s socio-economic
status. In fact, Silventoinen (2003) estimates that 20 percent of the variation
in height can be attributed to changes in one’s environment. Since especially
food consumption plays a major role in household expenses, changes in height
are foremost a consequence of changes in one’s economic conditions (Komlos,
1987). Thus, height has become an established proxy for the biological standard
of living in the economic history literature (e.g., Komlos, 1985, 1993; Deaton,
2008; Baten and Blum, 2012; Baten et al., 2013; Baten and Blum, 2014; Akachi and
Canning, 2015). Height measures can be found in military or prison records, for
instance, and are nowadays readily available (Baten and Blum, 2012).
There is a consensus in the literature that housing is a key determinant of
public health. A number of studies (e.g., Dunn, 2002; Evans, 2003; Northridge
et al., 2003; Diez Roux, 2003; Thomson et al., 2009; Egan et al., 2013) have found
that housing which offers healthier living conditions has positive impacts on
both physical and mental health, whereas housing in poorer living conditions
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has the opposite effect.
In general, two channels through which housing affects health can be identi-
fied (Shaw, 2004): first, the “hard” factors, e.g., temperature, humidity, ventila-
tion, toxins, or homelessness; and second, the “soft” factors, e.g., the low social
status attached to housing debt, deprived neighborhoods, etc. Poor housing
can lead to high blood pressure and serum cholesterol, allergies and asthma,
infectious and respiratory diseases, and similar health problems.
The relationship between poor housing conditions and ill health holds true
across various geographical, cultural, and temporal contexts; and it is important
to recall that illnesses affect adult height mostly early in life; namely during
childhood, when diseases use up nutrients and lead to a negative net nutritional
status which impairs growth. Diseases after an adult has reached their final
height do not affect the dependent variable in my analysis anymore. Hence,
height is always organized by birth cohorts.
Two possible sources of diseases, which are related to poor housing quality,
will be discussed in the following: poor sanitation and overcrowding. Sanita-
tion is an undisputed determinant of public health; yet there were times when
the effects of sanitation on public health were unknown or difficult to handle.
Poor hygiene during the industrial revolution, for example, was mainly due
to low wages, minimal investment in public health services as well as uncon-
trolled and ill-planned city and slum growth (Evans, 2004), causing sanitation
and living conditions in the European and American cities to deteriorate sig-
nificantly (Konteh, 2009). As a consequence, overcrowded, damp and unclean
houses and cities led to massive outbreaks of cholera, tuberculosis, diarrhea,
and whooping cough (Shaw, 2004). Evans (1988) elaborates on the six waves
of cholera that spread over Europe, where most of the sampled countries for
the present study are located. Three of these waves happened in the sampled
time period (1863–74, 1881–96, 1899–1923) and could have been favored by poor
quality of housing, e.g., poor hygienic standards or overcrowding.
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The British Parliament passed the first Public Health Act in 1848, which
suggested that health is determined by sanitation and revolutionized this field.
Subsequently, municipal boards of health received the mandate to supervise
and regulate public sanitation (Tulchinsky and Varavikova, 2014) and thereby
tried to contain the spread of diseases. Similar developments have been wit-
nessed in other parts of the world, e.g., with the formation of the Massachusetts
Sanitary Commission in 1850, Max von Pettenkoffer’s public lectures on health
in the 1870s in Munich, etc. (Tulchinsky and Varavikova, 2014). However, these
improvements took place very slowly, especially as rapid city growth increased
the problems at the same time. Better disease control improved health not much
before the 20th century (Easterlin, 1999).
Hatton and Bray (2010) studied heights of European men in the 19th and
20th centuries and found an average increase of about 1 centimeter per decade.
While the southern European countries experienced accelerated growth be-
tween 1951 and 1976, northern and middle-European men grew the most in
the transwar period, after which growth rates returned to more modest levels.
The authors attribute the strong growth between 1911 and 1955 to a fall in the
relative price of food as well as to a significant improvement in urban sanita-
tion.
The relationships between sanitation, housing quality, and health have been
studied empirically for today’s developing countries. Vyas et al. (2016), for in-
stance, analyze the height of Cambodian children from 2005 to 2010 and find
that better sanitation accounts for an increase in child height. In Cambodia,
more than three-quarters of all households defecated in the open as late as in
2005. This rate was reduced to two thirds by 2010. As soon as sanitation im-
proved, i.e., open defecation was reduced, children started to grow taller than
before. Also in the 19th and early 20th centuries, open defecation and shared
privies have been identified to be the most common sources of infections as
most houses during this period did not have their own sanitary arrangements.
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In fact, according to Meeker (1971), deaths caused by infectious diseases in U.S.
cities only started to diminish after a sanitary revolution in the 1880s. This
change was triggered by a preceding severe yellow fever epidemic in Mem-
phis, Tennessee; sparking an interest in public health. Yet, it was only in the
1930s that (mostly tiny) bathrooms became the standard in American homes
(Cowan, 1976).
The link between housing quality and health was also studied longitudi-
nally. Marsh et al. (2000), for instance, conclude that adult ill health is more
likely among people who lived in poor housing conditions in their younger
days. Likewise, Mendall et al. (1992) report that a lack of hot water supply in
earlier life favors the spread of helicobacter pylori, a bacteria found in the diges-
tive tract, which can cause gastritis, gastric ulcers, and cancer. Coggon et al.
(1993) analyze a sample of more than 8000 English men and women who were
born after 1900 and conclude that children living in houses without hot wa-
ter exhibited higher death rates from diseases as adults. Moreover, besides the
lack of household amenities and appropriate sanitation, both aforementioned
studies identify domestic overcrowding as one reason for the observed health
hazards.
An important determinant of health is crowding in houses. Using infant
mortality rates, Cage and Foster (2002) compare overcrowding in Scotland dur-
ing the first half of the 20th century and conclude that average room density
led to much worse outcomes in Glasgow than in Edinburgh where houses were
less crowded. Likewise, analyzing data from the Census of England and Wales
on over 21 million births given by roughly 6 million women, Haines (1995) re-
ports that infant and child mortality between 1890 and 1911 was considerably
higher for households with a low number of rooms. In fact, the detrimental ef-
fect on child mortality almost halved when the number of rooms per house in-
creased from 1 to more than 10. Even though the study does not clarify whether
the number of people per room diminished when the number of rooms rose, a
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study by Clark (2002) reports that the average density per house in England and
Wales decreased from 5.17 persons in 1870–1879 to 4.99 in 1900–1909. This sug-
gests that height gains could be (partly) due to more generous housing space
per capita. In a study similar to that by Haines, Kuh and Wadsworth (1989) ex-
amine a panel of English, Welsh and Scottish people born in the same week in
March 1946 and find that having lived in overcrowded conditions (more than
1.5 people per room) up to age eleven led to 4 cm shorter adult height compared
to adults who had not experienced such conditions in childhood.
Our study hypothesizes that less overcrowding results in higher prices and
therefore, disease environments should be less demanding. There are two rea-
sons for this argument. First, infectious diseases are easily transmitted in over-
crowded places. Hence, more spacious houses per family, which tend to be
costlier, should mitigate the spread of such diseases. And second, sanitary fa-
cilities add space to a house. A bathroom requires at least one additional room
and the necessary infrastructure such as drain pipes, taps, and boilers, has to
be installed. Therefore, houses with better sanitary facilities should be more
expensive on average. However, better sanitation alone does not account for an
improvement in health as it can hardly mitigate the spread of respiratory dis-
eases such as tuberculosis which are mostly transmitted through the air. There-
fore, it is also necessary to additionally take (over)crowding into consideration
as one determinant of housing quality. For the empirical part of this paper,
however, it has to be noted that the present analysis does not take into account
that there were different house and room sizes, as has been done by Cage and
Foster (2002). Instead, it is simply assumed that a room density of, say, 1.5 peo-
ple per room harbors more health hazards than a lower room density. Such a
case would be reflected by a lower house price.
The idea that additional rooms, a bathroom or household amenities such as
water supply could increase house prices is not far-fetched and has been shown
using a hedonic price model estimated by, e.g., Margo (1996)—albeit for rental
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prices in a slightly different time period (1830–1860). He analyzed rental an-
nouncements in the newspaper and found that additional rooms and additional
bathrooms increased the cost of renting in New York. Among other variables,
he determines the partial effects of the number of rooms per dwelling, the pres-
ence of a bathroom, and the quality “modern” on logarithmic rent prices per
day. Modern rental units are dwellings that feature improvements such as gas
and water supply. Table 5.1 reports these regression coefficients, which show
by how much a certain characteristic can increase the daily rent price in percent.
More recent work by Eichholtz et al. (2017), who construct rental price indices
for seven European cities from 1500 to present, has confirmed that housing
prices have increased because of better housing quality (including increased
housing space per capita, heating, water supply, and the like) rather than be-
cause of rising market prices. Even though these two studies construct rental
price series, the logic that additional quality increases housing costs also holds
for house prices, as the price of a house can be viewed as the present value of
perpetual rent.
Table 5.1: Rental price premiums for certain dwelling characteristics.
Non-New York City New York City
Number of rooms (log) 0.775 0.746
(14.100) (22.651)
Bath 0.149 0.110
(1.582) (2.474)
Modern 0.078 0.129
(1.437) (3.371)
Note: t-values in parentheses. Source: Margo (1996)
Public health and living conditions actually deteriorated during the years of
the industrialization and only improved slowly during the late 19th and early
20th centuries. Particularly in the 19th century, this was mainly due to massive
and unplanned urbanization, little investment spent on sanitation as a public
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good, and the mostly unknown or ignored link between poor hygiene and ill
health. At the same time, house prices increased, raising the question whether
there could be a causal relationship between the two.
It is also well understood how housing quality, which entails appropriate
sanitation, household amenities, and low crowding that a person did or did
not enjoy during his or her early years, impairs their health and adult height.
The question of interest is therefore if the improvement in housing quality over
the observed period had a measurable impact on human stature or if increas-
ing house prices rather reduced a household’s disposable income and therefore
impaired health.
5.3 Data and method
To study the hypothesized relationship, nominal house price data is taken from
Jorda` et al. (2017) and Knoll et al. (2017). These prices were deflated using the
CPI and are actual values that are not interpolated. In contrast, some control
variables are interpolated to get 5-yearly data and thus guarantee sufficiently
large sample sizes. The analyses are based on 5-yearly data.
Male height data is sourced from Baten and Blum (2012) and mostly based
on military data. The authors used several techniques to obtain a dataset of
male adult height that is representative of the countries under study. For in-
stance, in cases where height data of teenagers was used, the authors estimated
the likely final, adult height of these teenagers. Furthermore, potential biases
arising from migrant populations were eliminated by adjusting their heights
by appropriate centimeter differentials, yielding data that more accurately re-
flected adult heights in the country of destination. Moreover, since it has been
shown that men tend to overestimate their stature, self-reported heights were
corrected using the method proposed by Hatton and Bray (2010). In general,
different biases pertaining to, for instance, the incarceration in prison or slave
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trade were taken care of with great effort.
House prices are used as proxies for increasing housing quality, i.e., less
crowding in houses and better sanitation, which is hypothesized to have a
positive influence on adult height. Figures 5.2 and 5.3 depict this relationship
and suggest a positive correlation. The correlations between height and house
prices at the country level are graphed in figure 5.5 in the appendix.
Figure 5.2: House price residuals against height residuals.
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Note: This figure plots the residuals from a regression of house
prices on the explanatory variables against the residuals from
a regression of height on all explanatory variables but house
prices. Data sources: Jorda` et al. (2017); Knoll et al. (2017) for
house prices and Baten and Blum (2012) for adult height.
It may be objected that the housing markets may have been influenced by
strong market power of house owners or landlords who could set prices above
the fair value of a house, especially in the earlier half of the studied period.
However, the historical housing literature does not agree with this hypothe-
sis: Morgan and Daunton (1983), in contrast, report that tenants in England
gained even more legal power than landlords towards the late 19th century.
Even though legal power is not necessarily the same as market power, it could
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be argued that landlords could have faced legal action if they had required hor-
rendous rents and house prices. Furthermore, Eichholtz et al. (2017) report that
rental markets in Europe were not dominated by monopolistic landlords.
Figure 5.3 reveals some moderate outliers: Belgium, the Netherlands, and
Norway. These countries display relatively high house prices between 1865 and
1905 for given height levels (for greater detail, please refer to figure 5.4). The
original sources that Knoll et al. use for that period rely on urban house price
data from Brussels, Amsterdam, and Oslo, and therefore, explanations for the
national house price developments may be found by taking a look at the eco-
nomic developments in these three capitals. In the case of Amsterdam, house
prices may have been driven upwards because of a strong increase in the pop-
ulation of Amsterdam in the second half of the 19th century, while the supply
of housing remained more or less constant (Eichholtz, 1997). In Oslo, house
price surges may be traced back to the booming construction sector starting in
the decade 1890–1900 (Eitrheim and Erlandsen, 2005). Lastly, for the case of
Brussels, De Bruyne (1956) mentions that the upward development in house
prices in the decades around 1900 coincide with a boom in the Brussels econ-
omy. In a nutshell, the inverse relationship between house prices and health at
the country-level are likely driven by the exceptional house price developments
in the aforementioned capitals. However, section 5.4 will demonstrate that the
overall positive relationship between the two variables is not affected by these
outliers.
Merging the datasets by Jorda` et al., Knoll et al. and Baten and Blum re-
sults in a final sample of 14 countries. This sample contains Austria, Belgium,
Canada, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Finland, France, Japan, the Nether-
lands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States of Amer-
ica. Even though the data are available to present, this study deliberately looks
only at the period 1870–1965 since after that, houses have started to become
also a financial asset besides providing shelter. Therefore, it cannot be guaran-
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Figure 5.3: House prices and height across countries and years.
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Note: A more detailed representation of the outliers can be
found in figure 5.4. Data sources: Jorda` et al. (2017); Knoll et al.
(2017) for house prices and Baten and Blum (2012) for adult
height.
teed that house price increases after 1965 have only reflected improvements in
quality and not higher demand.
Another factor contributing to welfare is nutrition. This link is twofold.
First, better nutrition is a result of higher income because higher-quality food-
stuffs become available. And second, the composition of the nutrition deter-
mines health and human stature (Hatton, 2013). In fact, a person’s net nutri-
tional status in the first few years of life determines most of their adult non-
genetically determined height (Komlos, 1987, 1993; Case and Paxson, 2008;
Sunder, 2013; Baten and Blum, 2014). More specifically, the intake of animal
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proteins such as from cattle, which (among other things) favor the develop-
ment of antibodies and amino acids to fight infectious diseases (Grigg, 1995;
Baten, 1999), and calcium have proven to be important determinants of physi-
cal growth (De Beer, 2012). By contrast, a person who supplies physically de-
manding labor over a long term is shorter than a less physically-hard working
person because the first uses up more nutrients.
Even though these nutrients can be supplied by a variety of foodstuffs, cattle
per capita is used here to proxy protein and calcium intake for two reasons;
on one hand because cattle were kept in all the sampled countries and on the
other hand because they can supply both meat (protein) and milk (calcium), as
opposed to pigs, for example, which cannot be milked. Data on protein intake
are sourced from Baten and Blum (2014).
Furthermore, income is used as a control variable for two reasons. First, in-
dividuals tend to self-select into renting or owning depending on their income
or social class, which might affect their health1. Macintyre et al. (2003) survey
owners and renters of social dwellings in west Scotland and find that owners
lead healthier lives than renters. Luginaah et al. (2010) find similar results for
owners and renters in Ghana. Consequently, this implies that, because indi-
viduals with higher incomes tend to be homeowners rather than renters, the
first may be taller than the latter. Moreover, Evans (1988) reports that income is
negatively correlated with cholera death numbers.
Second, house prices can have a positive and a negative impact on human
stature. The positive impact has already been explained in detail. The negative
impact can arise because more expensive housing cuts disposable household
income and thus impairs access to health services, healthier housing condi-
tions, and quality nutrition. Adjei and Kyei (2013), for instance, conclude that
poor-quality housing and sanitation conditions in Ghana are determined by
low household income levels. The inclusion of income should eliminate these
1For an extensive overview of further possible explanations, see Dietz and Haurin (2003).
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problems and permit comparison of households with identical income. At the
end of the day, however, the question whether the positive or negative effect
will predominate is mainly an empirical issue. Since the data for laborers’ real
wage are scanty, real GDP per capita growth is used to proxy income.
A number of control variables are used to preclude omitted variable bias.
Population density is used as another control variable as it may be healthier to
live in cities that are less densely populated because the lower risk of spread of
infectious diseases. Long-term interest rates by Jorda` et al. (2017) are included
too: they should proxy the cost of buying a house and make sure that this cost
is not captured by the house price variable.
The inclusion of other variables measuring inequality would have been de-
sirable. However, since democracy values did not vary a lot over the observed
time and countries, they could not be considered explicitly because of the fixed
effects regression. The same is of course true for the proportions of mountain-
ous areas in a country, which have an effect on the variety of foods and animals
that can be grown and consumed. Table 5.2 provides an overview of the in-
cluded variables.
Fixed effects method is employed because it is reasonable to believe that
there are unobservable country characteristics that would lead to endogeneity
problems if omitted. Moreover, this methodology filters out the genetically de-
termined growth potential in each society and permits analysis of the remain-
ing 20 percent of body height growth that is non-genetic (Silventoinen, 2003).
To control for aggregate trends around the globe, birth half-centuries are used
as time dummies, which allows to differentiate between certain birth cohorts.
Moreover, standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered around
countries to safeguard against potential serial correlation.
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Table 5.2: Descriptive statistics, 1870–1965.
Variable Obs. Mean SD Min. Max.
Height 280 171.53 4.90 156.57 182.2
House prices 221 49.66 23.75 0.75 104.90
Population density 280 88.62 87.63 0.23 362.81
Cattle (p.c.) 250 0.54 0.53 0.01 3.24
Cattle (p.c., ln) 250 -0.96 0.91 -4.41 1.18
Interest rate 274 4.49 1.67 2.21 16.40
GDP growth (p.c.) 280 0.10 0.16 -0.53 1.23
5.4 Results
The following analysis focuses on examining the relationship between housing
quality and a person’s biological standard of living. The data are actual ob-
servations; only the cattle variable has been interpolated because otherwise the
sample would have shrunk significantly due to missing values. This should not
be problematic, however, since cattle is not of central importance.
The results of the baseline regression are reported in table 5.3. All regres-
sions are carried out with time fixed effects based on birth half centuries and
with standard errors that are clustered by country. The first column contains the
regression results including only house prices and time fixed effects. The results
in the adjacent columns (2) to (5) show that adding more control variables does
not change the relationship between house prices and final adult height qualita-
tively or quantitatively. In the first four columns, the coefficient of house prices
is significant at the 1 percent level. A one-point increase in the real house price
index thus leads to a gain in final adult height by 0.04 to 0.05 cm. The coefficient
of per capita GDP growth is also positive and statistically significant. This coef-
ficient captures the effect of disposable household income net of food expendi-
tures, housing financing costs, and other housing-related expenses, which are
already controlled for separately by the other variables. Since the inclusion of
income does not alter the effect that housing quality has on height, it can be con-
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cluded that even though theoretically, increasing house prices may adversely
affect household income, this effect cannot be witnessed here. In two countries
with identical income, the person with the higher-quality—and thereby more
expensive—house is on average taller and therefore healthier.
Population density turns out to be positively related to height. This seems
counterintuitive as one would think that densely populated places are more
hazardous to health than ones with lower population density. However, this
result could also be interpreted differently: a person living in a loosely popu-
lated country might not easily have access to a doctor or a pharmacist, whereas
a person living in a densely populated country might have a variety of health
services available in their neighborhoods, which would result in a positive re-
lationship with human stature.
Cattle per capita and long-term interest rates do not behave as expected.
As for the cattle variable, it has been argued that it is just a rough proxy for
the quality of one’s nutrition. However, even though quantitatively, cattle was
the most important provider of meat and milk, the composition of protein-rich
nutrition could have changed over time (Baten and Blum, 2014) and therefore,
cattle per capita may not capture protein and calcium consumption adequately.
Nevertheless, at the end of the day, cattle and interest rates are not of central
interest in this paper but were only included to safeguard against omitted vari-
able bias.
Heights in the sampled countries rose by 10 cm over the period 1870–1965,
while at the same time, average real house price indices gained roughly 30
points. According to the regression results in the first row in table 5.3, each
of these points came along with a height increase of roughly half a millimeter.
In total, the presented house price increases, which represent improving hous-
ing quality, were thus responsible for a gain in final adult height of roughly
30 ∗ 0.05 = 1.5 cm across the sampled countries. This seems economically in-
significant. However, Baten and Komlos (1998) report that a height differential
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of 1 cm in 1860–1900 translated to 1.8 years of life expectancy. For 1950, 1 cm
was equivalent to 1.2 years. Since this table shows results for the period be-
tween 1870 and 1965, it can be concluded that an increase of 1.5 cm came along
with an additional life expectancy of between 1.2 and 2.7 years, on average,
which is anything but insignificant.
Table 5.3: Housing and health, fixed effects: regression of height.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Conventional coefficients
House prices 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04***
(0.006) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Beta coefficients
House prices 1.19*** 1.09*** 1.00*** 1.05*** 1.02***
(0.006) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Conventional coefficients
Population density 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.04***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Cattle p.c. -3.10 -3.78* -3.71*
(0.154) (0.062) (0.064)
Interest rate 0.32** 0.30**
(0.013) (0.019)
GDP p.c. growth 1.11*
(0.052)
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 166.81 163.82 161.33 159.41 159.65
Observations 221 221 209 207 207
Adj. R2 0.66 0.79 0.79 0.81 0.81
Note: p-values in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by coun-
try. ***, **, and * refer to significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respec-
tively. Time fixed effects are based on birth half centuries. Constants
are significant at the 1% level.
While it is difficult to imagine how much a one-point increase in the real
house price index is, running the regressions with standardized house prices
might be more insightful. Therefore, table 5.3 also reports the beta coefficients
of house prices in the second row, which show how strongly final adult height
is affected when house prices change by one standard deviation. This can be
viewed as a rather extreme case. The findings suggest that such an increase in
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real house prices leads to a gain in final adult height of between 1 cm and 1.20
cm. According to Baten and Komlos (1998), such an increase was equivalent to
1.2 to 2.1 more years of life expectancy.
As a final robustness check, the regressions were run without Japan, as af-
ter looking at figure 5.3, it could be suspected that Japan drives the results.
However, by omitting Japan, the effect of house prices on height increases only
marginally, i.e., by less than 0.02 mm per one-point increase, or 0.4 mm per
standard-deviation increase in the house price index.
5.5 Conclusion
The literature on the biological standard of living in a historical context is vast
and significant effort has been devoted to exploring the determinants of adult
height. This paper made a contribution to this strand of the literature by quanti-
fying two characteristics of housing quality—sanitation and crowding—which
have, so far, only been vaguely subsumed under the term “disease environ-
ment”. Taking this approach, this paper examined the influence of housing
quality on human stature in the period from 1870 to 1965. After witnessing
some severe epidemics especially in Europe, this period was marked by increas-
ing awareness concerning the implications of sanitation for health, which was
accompanied by improving sanitary standards and living conditions at home.
This paper is the first to approximate housing quality with real house prices to
study their effect on adult height. This approach stood to reason since house
price developments reflected housing quality more than did higher demand
(Eichholtz et al., 2017).
Across all model specifications, the coefficient of housing is statistically sig-
nificant. This result implies that countries with better housing quality had taller
populations. Possible explanations for this relationship are sanitary facilities
that were added to the homes and more housing space per capita, which were
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both reflected by higher real house values. The average contribution of a one-
point gain in house prices to adult height was 0.05 mm, or 1.5 cm over the stud-
ied period. A one-standard-deviation increase in real house prices came along
with a 1.00–1.20 cm taller adult height. This was roughly equivalent to 1.2 to 2.1
more years of life expectancy (Baten and Komlos, 1998). Moreover, as soon as
income is controlled for, this effect remains unchanged. This result implies that
house prices do not adversely affect health via decreased household income.
This paper also acts on the suggestion by Komlos (1998) who criticizes that
in past research, the effect of rising income on height was likely confounded
with the effect of increasing housing costs. Hence, the impact of income on
height was probably overestimated whenever housing costs were omitted from
the analyses. Similarly, Margo and Steckel (1983) point to the possibility that
increasing housing costs could have impaired access to high-quality nutrition,
resulting in shorter adult height. This present study tackles these two points
of criticism by separately controlling for house prices besides protein intake
and income in order to disentangle these effects and isolate the contribution of
housing quality to height.
Of the total 10 cm increase in average height across all the sampled coun-
tries, 1.5 cm could be attributed to increasing housing quality. This seems neg-
ligible at first sight but is a relatively large fraction of the total height increase
in light of other, groundbreaking achievements during that period: one should
not ignore the significant advances in medicine, food storing, or technological
change, which without doubt improved living conditions so much that they
accounted for the largest portion of these 10 cm. Against this backdrop, a con-
tribution of housing quality to height of 15 percent is clearly impressive.
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5.6 Appendix
Figure 5.4: House prices and height in Belgium, the Netherlands, and Norway.
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Note: Japan is depicted as a reference point. The numbers in the graph refer to
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Data sources: Jorda` et al. (2017); Knoll et al. (2017) for house prices and Baten
and Blum (2012) for adult height.
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Figure 5.5: Correlation between real house prices and height by country, 1870–1965.
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Chapter 6
Homeownership: Boon and Bane
6.1 Introduction
The growth literature has long overlooked one factor that has the potential to in-
hibit economic growth: homeownership. Even though homeownership varies
across countries, it plays an important role in an economy and its households.
For example, according to the U.S. Census Bureau (2011), more than 65 percent
of U.S. homes were occupied by their owners in 2010, and the largest part of
an average household’s consumption expenditures is being spent on housing
and related services. Moreover, the aggregate value of median owner-occupied
housing constituted almost 95 percent of the U.S. GDP in 20101. Despite these
figures, the relationship between homeownership and GDP growth has been
largely ignored in past studies, while the body of literature on the positive re-
lationship between homeownership and consumption is huge. Even though
consumption is probably the most important component of GDP, it does not
tell the whole story about GDP growth. In light of the recent financial crisis and
the importance that is attached to homeownership, this gap in the literature is
surprising.
1For this value, the aggregate housing wealth as proposed by Case et al. (2005) was computed
and divided by that year’s GDP.
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There is consensus that housing fuels consumption, as suggested by the per-
manent income hypothesis (e.g., Lettau and Ludvigson, 2004), and it has been
somewhat assumed that an increase in consumption should lead to an increase
in GDP. Even though it has been confirmed that homeownership, which is de-
fined as the fraction of homes that are occupied by their owners, increases con-
sumption, there is no reason to believe that this unconditionally translates into
an increase in GDP, as other components of GDP may decrease at the same time.
Therefore, it is possible that a country that exceeds a critical point of homeown-
ership loses part of its economic performance as investment in housing crowds
out investment in more productive, non-residential uses (Mills, 1987). Related
to this issue, figure 6.1 depicts that even before the financial crisis, there had
been no straightforward positive relationship between homeownership rates
and GDP per capita.
Figure 6.1: GDP p.c. is negatively associated with the homeownership rate
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Note that the negative relationship at high homeownership rates existed even before the
financial crisis.
6.1. INTRODUCTION 107
This paper does not dispute that—at least up to that certain point—
homeownership is a positive driver of growth. The consumption of housing
and related goods and services creates jobs and income, owning provides a
hedge against inflation and increasing rents, and for already wealthy buyers
an additional asset in their portfolio helps them diversify, to mention just a few.
However, once a critical homeownership rate is exceeded, there are two reasons
why GDP growth could suffer.
(1) As we move along the range of homeownership rates, one has to ask
who these owners are. Part of them may have incomes that do not suffice to
sustain such a standard of living without difficulty. Rather, owning a house
comes at high costs such as the obvious ones: taxes, mortgage costs, insurance
or maintenance; but also a decrease in alternative investment possibilities in
general, or, for low-income owners, a very poorly diversified portfolio because
the largest part of their portfolios consist of just one asset (Goetzmann, 1993;
Brueckner, 1997; Yamashita, 2003). Yet, it is well-known that diversification is
the key to reducing risk. These low-income households are always at a high
risk of being unable to service their mortgages and running into bankruptcy.
Furthermore, it has been shown that owning can decrease the mobility of labor.
(2) Too much homeownership could be the outcome of a flawed consump-
tion versus investment decision. A conventional wisdom says that consump-
tion is the engine of economic growth. However, it is actually investment that
is every economy’s driver. Yet, money that is bound in a house is actually
not invested—it is consumed: because people spend money on goods and ser-
vices that do not produce any additional output for the economy. If the down-
payment was instead saved in a bank account and used to pay for a monthly
rent, the banks could fulfill their role as an intermediary, i.e., bundle the savings
of all tenants and make them available as loans to firms that have a promising
business model and projects with a positive net present value. This way, the
money is used to produce an additional output. Similarly, firms could invest in
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order to make their production technologies more efficient. In fact, Mills (1987)
estimates that the social return to housing is only half that to non-housing in-
vestment. While a “reasonable” homeownership rate is essential to a country’s
GDP for the aforementioned reasons, an excessively high homeownership rate
implies that a lot of money is not invested in productive assets in the economy.
In fact, this problem is well-known to policy-makers: various studies (Hender-
shott and Hu, 1981, 1983) have noted that already in the 1970s and 80s, there
was a need to increase U.S. productivity growth, which was declining at that
time. Some policies were therefore targeted at increasing business investment
by, for instance, shifting capital flows from residential towards non-residential,
industrial sectors in order to decrease overinvestment in housing in favor of the
capital–labor ratio.
This paper adds to the housing and growth literature in the following ways.
First, it is the first research paper that addresses the relationship between home-
ownership and GDP growth in more detail at the aggregate level. It does not
rely on consumption data because an increase in consumption only leads to a
rising GDP when the other components of GDP are not affected. Furthermore,
this paper also differs from other analyses as it does not use variables such
as house prices or residential investment, which do not distinguish between
owner-occupied and rented dwellings. Instead, it argues that the fraction of
owned houses of all dwellings in a given country has more explanatory power
for economic growth.
Second, it investigates not only the linear but also the non-linear relation-
ship between owning and growth. Thereby, the analysis allows to draw con-
clusions about the positive effect of owning at low to intermediate homeowner-
ship rates and a critical point at which the sign of the relationship gets reversed.
This result is robust to various specifications of the model, which are estimated
using system GMM to reduce potential simultaneity in the model. This way,
the risk that homeownership rates affect GDP growth and GDP growth affects
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homeownership rates can be circumvented to some extent. However, to fully
overcome endogeneity problems, instrumental variable (IV) regression is con-
ducted as well.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 6.2 summarizes the main findings
of the related literature before 6.3 outlines the theoretical basis for the empirical
analysis. Also, the hypotheses which will be tested are derived in this section.
The data and the estimation method are presented in section 6.4. Section 6.5
discusses the results and section 6.6 concludes.
6.2 Related literature
6.2.1 Housing and the economy
The question how strongly housing, as opposed to non-housing, contributes
to GDP was addressed by several researchers. For example, in a two-sector
growth model with a housing and an “everything else” sector, Mills (1987) in-
troduces a parameter θ which represents the degree of capital market distor-
tions and permits derivation of the social returns to housing and non-housing
capital. His empirical results using data for 1929–1983 show that the social re-
turns to non-housing were about twice that of the social returns to housing.
His research also confirms the hypothesis that the U.S. overinvested in the res-
idential sector during the period under study. Two years later, Mills’ findings
for housing overinvestment and the difference in returns to the two types of
capital were confirmed by Mills (1989) and Hendershott (1989), although to a
less dramatic extent. In sum, this research shows that despite resulting in a
lower output to the society, capital was predominantly concentrated in hous-
ing, which ultimately decreased the U.S. productivity.
This distortion was also investigated by Hendershott and Hu (1981, 1983)
who blame the U.S. tax code, which gives preferential treatment to homeown-
ership, for the decline in productivity. Moreover, Rosen (1979) estimates that
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without the housing tax subsidy, the U.S. productivity could have increased by
$107 per household. Mills (1987) furthermore finds an increase of around 10
percent in real income if there were no overinvestment in housing. Thus, the
crowding out of non-residential investment leads to a socially non-efficient re-
source allocation. Green et al. (1994) even speculate that countries where the
government encourages non-residential investment could be more successful
economically than those which allow for extensive residential investment. Be-
cause of these findings, researchers have often referred to housing as “unpro-
ductive” and to non-housing as “productive” assets, especially in the develop-
ment economics literature (Mills, 1987).
Green (1997) builds on Mills’ results to examine the influence of the two
capital types on the business cycle. Using Granger-causality tests, he shows
that residential investment Granger-causes GDP, but not the other way around.
Furthermore, non-residential investment does not Granger-cause GDP, while
GDP Granger-causes non-residential investment. In sum, Green concludes that
housing leads the business cycle while non-housing lags it, and that residen-
tial investment could therefore be “a true ‘cause’ of GDP” (p. 260). However,
Green acknowledges that housing could simply be a forward-looking invest-
ment made by households that expect higher future incomes. That is, as house-
holds expect to prosper, they may decide to expand their housing investment.
This raises concerns that homeownership may be highly endogenous and that
even lagged homeownership rates may not solve this problem.
Green’s finding of Granger causality was confirmed for consumption by
Coulson and Kim (2000). From this result, the authors conclude that housing in-
directly affects GDP. Moreover, using impulse response functions and variance
decomposition, the authors find that GDP responds more strongly to shocks in
residential than in non-residential investment, even when the latter is placed
first in the causal ordering. They also report that residential investment ex-
plains more of the variation in GDP than non-residential investment, which
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makes it an especially powerful multiplier.
The literature has argued that plant and equipment, such as that used in
agriculture and industry, tend to produce more output than the housing sector
(Mills, 1987). But at the same time, many studies have found a large housing
wealth effect on consumption, which means that homeowners consume more
from housing than from financial wealth. This will be discussed in further de-
tail in the next subsection. That implies that, if housing investment increases
consumption but decreases GDP, other components of GDP must be adversely
affected by housing. A common argument is that productivity can only be
improved when technologies become more efficient; however, investment in
housing can hardly improve production technologies. When market distortions
such as housing subsidies divert the flow of capital away from more produc-
tive assets, less capital is left to replace and improve plant and equipment, i.e.
productive assets. An improvement in production technologies would lead to
more output for the same dollar of input, but any additional dollar invested in
housing due to an economic distortion does not earn the higher social return to
capital. This implies that the economy suffers productivity losses once housing
investment is expanded beyond its socially efficient level. And indeed, studies
finding lower social returns to housing than to non-housing, as the aforemen-
tioned, have provided evidence for this idea.
This literature review does not dispute that there is a positive social return to
housing, but it has been shown that the returns to residential capital are small.
Furthermore, once we subdivide residential investment into investment going
towards owner-occupied versus rented dwellings, we could gain more interest-
ing insights. The next subsection is devoted to that literature.
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6.2.2 Positive and negative externalities of homeownership
There are a number of reasons why a household would want to become an
outright-owner or transition from renting to owning. Many of them are re-
lated to life’s uncertainties. Besides the mere accumulation of wealth, one rea-
son may be lack of trust in the retirement system of the country of residence,
which makes people take care of their own retirement planning rather than rely
on the schemes provided by the government or employer. Therefore, becom-
ing a homeowner would be a strategy to save up for retirement. Interestingly,
homeowners indeed tend to be wealthier than their renting counterparts (e.g.,
Haurin et al., 1996; Dietz and Haurin, 2003; Matha¨ et al., 2017) even when such
two households start out with the same initial endowment. This is somewhat
puzzling since it implies that there occurs a change in a household’s (saving)
behavior in the moment of becoming a homeowner. This empirical observation
has kept researchers busy for a long time and the puzzle has not yet been fully
solved.
Another reason which is linked to uncertainty is that housing wealth ex-
hibits a low correlation with financial assets and inflation, which makes it a
good companion for financial assets in a (wealthy) household’s portfolio. More-
over, homeownership serves as a hedge against rising rents (Goetzmann and
Spiegel, 2000) and can be found predominantly in regions with high rent risk
(Sinai and Souleles, 2005).
Consumption is another important factor to consider, as it is commonly said
to be an economy’s engine. A number of studies have analyzed the impact of
housing wealth on consumption behavior and have found a considerable hous-
ing wealth effect. Using U.S. data, Benjamin et al. (2004a,b); Kishor (2007), to
name just a few, document that the marginal propensity to consume (MPC)
from housing wealth is higher than the MPC from financial wealth. This is con-
firmed by Slacalek (2009) for U.S. data and, to a lesser extent, using data on
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other countries. The link between housing wealth and household consumption
was also studied by Case et al. (2005) who find a significant and large housing
wealth effect on consumption. Furthermore, Simo-Kengne et al. (2015) show
that real housing returns have a positive effect on real per-capita consumption
growth. In addition, Bostic et al. (2009) have estimated for U.S. data that a
decrease in consumption (relative to 2005 levels), triggered by a 10 percent de-
crease in housing wealth, translates into a one-percentage-point drop in real
GDP growth.
To analyze the consumption behavior of older and younger households as a
reaction to house price changes, Calcagno et al. (2009) use panel data of Italian
households. They conclude that older households are more affected by house
price changes than younger ones. Campbell and Cocco (2007) find similar re-
sults for the U.K.
It appears that owning is indeed superior over renting, but there is also ev-
idence that homeownership may harm the economy. For example, the well-
known Oswald hypothesis (Oswald, 1996) states that due to mobility costs,
homeowners are less mobile in the labor market than renters and are there-
fore more likely to become unemployed. The empirical evidence on this issue
is, however, mixed. Munch et al. (2006), for instance, find a negative correla-
tion between homeownership and the duration of unemployment but also a
positive association between homeownership and the chances of finding local
jobs. In a later study, Munch et al. (2008) find a negative link between home-
ownership and mobility but a positive one with wage levels. Moreover, while
some studies (e.g., Coulson and Fisher, 2002, 2009) argue that, in aggregate,
high homeownership levels are associated with new jobs and better labor mar-
ket outcomes, Blanchflower and Oswald (2013) find that fewer businesses are
started when owner-occupation rates increase. On top of that, Blanchflower
and Oswald document that a rise in the U.S. homeownership rate is usually fol-
lowed by a rise in the unemployment rate and that the labor mobility of owners
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is much lower than that of renters. Similar results have been found by Green
and Hendershott (2001), albeit only for middle-aged households, who are still
part of the labor force and have accumulated sufficient housing wealth to suffer
from their limited mobility. Furthermore, Ferreira et al. (2010) state that every
additional $1,000 in real annual mortgage costs decrease household mobility by
roughly 12 percent.
Concerning the household portfolio, Goetzmann and Spiegel (2000) point
out that homeownership among low-income households bears significant risks
such as negative home equity and bankruptcy. Additionally, at the household
level, overinvesting in housing distorts portfolio allocation (e.g., Goetzmann,
1993; Brueckner, 1997; Yamashita, 2003).
Yet, capital allocation may not only be distorted at the household but also
at the macro level. A number of relevant studies in that area (e.g., Rosen, 1979;
Hendershott and Hu, 1981, 1983; Mills, 1987, 1989; Hendershott, 1989) have al-
ready been discussed in the previous subsection.
To sum up, housing can have various influences on GDP. On the one hand,
housing can stimulate the economy since it increases consumption. On the
other hand, however, it can also harm the economy as some studies have hinted
at the possibility that overinvestment in residential capital might result in un-
derinvestment in business investments despite higher returns in that sector,
thereby risking diminishing economic growth. At the end of the day, all these
negative consequences will eventually show up in the GDP; the question is
whether or not the positive externalities of owning are large enough to out-
weigh the negative ones.
6.2.3 Contribution
Very few studies analyze the implications of the housing market for economic
output, and to the best of my knowledge, most of these studies do not dis-
6.2. RELATED LITERATURE 115
tinguish between owner-occupied and rented dwellings. In his study on so-
cial returns to housing and non-housing, Mills (1987) additionally analyzes the
returns to owning and renting separately and concludes that they do not dif-
fer from each other. However, he acknowledges that due to econometric and
computational challenges, the estimates may not be reliable. By contrast, this
present study argues that it is the sum of benefits and disadvantages of, or be-
haviors related to, homeownership that might affect a country’s output.
In light of the recent financial crisis and the importance that is attached to
homeownership in an economic and household-related sense, it is striking that
the link between homeownership and growth has not been studied in greater
detail yet. As Miller et al. (2011) point out, consumption is an important indi-
cator; however, “it is not a complete statistic for the economy” (p. 528). This
paper tries to fill this void.
The underlying hypothesis of this paper is that the increase in consumption
may be counterbalanced by decreases in other components of GDP such that the
overall net effect of homeownership on GDP will be negative at certain owner-
ship levels. One explanation could be that housing is inferior to non-housing in-
vestment because it is not an investment in that it doesn’t increase an economy’s
future productivity. The other may be that, as more and more households tran-
sition from renting to owning, more and more low-income households become
owners, who would be better off renting. Therefore, this study uses aggregate
growth data as dependent and homeownership as explanatory variables. To
overcome endogeneity problems, IV regression will be conducted as well.
My research addresses the question whether homeownership is an uncon-
ditional, positive driver of economic growth or not, i.e., whether homeowner-
ship should always be preferred over renting from an economic perspective. To
this end, a determinants-of-growth regression based on an augmented Solow
growth model is estimated which captures the positive and negative effects of
owner-occupied housing in a panel of 21 countries over the period 2000–2014—
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a relatively large sample compared to previous studies. The inclusion of a linear
and a squared homeownership term permits computation of the turning point,
i.e., the point where the positive effects of homeownership start to be offset and
outweighed by the negative ones. In this regard, the results found in studies on
consumption do not contradict the findings of this study but rather explain the
movement on the upward-branch of the hump-shaped relationship between
homeownership and GDP growth.
6.3 Model and hypotheses
The basis is an augmented Solow model that relates growth to various country-
specific factors:
g = f (i, (n + p + δ), Y, S, h, h2,Z) (6.1)
In this model, g is the per capita GDP growth rate of a country. i and
(n + p + δ) come from the original Solow (1956) model, where i is a country’s
investment or saving rate, and (n + p + δ) is the sum of the population growth
rate n, technological progress p, and capital depreciation δ. Y is a country’s ini-
tial income, which can also be understood as a proxy for a country’s physical
capital stock, and S is human capital. The latter two factors have augmented the
traditional Solow model in a number of studies (e.g., Mankiw et al., 1992; Barro,
1991, 2001, 2003). Novel in this setting is the inclusion of the homeownership
rate as a linear and a quadratic term, h and h2.
According to this model, each country will arrive at a steady state which de-
pends on its unique characteristics, hence the country-specific control variables
in the vector Z. The controls are standard in the empirical growth literature
(e.g., Barro, 2001, 2003; Checherita-Westphal and Rother, 2012; Sassi and Gasmi,
2014) and include country characteristics and policy variables: the government
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consumption ratio, trade openness, inflation, the terms of trade, democracy and
democracy squared, and life expectancy.
The core hypothesis from neoclassical growth models is conditional con-
vergence: countries with a lower initial GDP Y should grow faster than those
which started at high levels of initial GDP and are thus closer to their steady
state. Human capital S should also have a positive influence on GDP growth
for obvious reasons. Furthermore, the model predicts that GDP growth g is
higher when the saving rate i grows and the adjusted population growth rate
n + p + δ diminishes.
The following control variables are standard in the empirical growth liter-
ature; their expected signs will thus be discussed only briefly. Government
consumption, even though there are more favorable and less favorable types of
spending (Kneller et al., 1999), should have an overall negative impact on GDP
growth. The sign of trade openness should be positive since countries that are
more actively engaged in the world markets should have a higher GDP growth.
The terms of trade are a measure of external competitiveness, and more com-
petitive countries should grow faster than less competitive ones. The inflation
rate should have a negative impact on GDP growth, as a higher inflation rate
implies macroeconomic instability. Democracy is measured on a range between
-10 and +10 where higher positive values stand for more democracy. Whereas
the sign of democracy should be positive, the sign of the squared term should be
negative, allowing for an adverse net effect of this variable at certain democracy
levels. Last but not least, life expectancy should affect GDP growth positively.
My interest lies in the parameters that measure the influence of the rate of
owner-occupied housing. This influence is twofold. When it is considered to
have a linear relationship with growth, the expected sign of the coefficient h is
probably positive because there are many good reasons for homeownership be-
ing a driver of economic growth. However, the empirical model also accounts
for a potential negative impact of owning, since the homeownership rate will
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also be considered in its squared version. The squared version allows for a neg-
ative net effect of the explanatory variable, h2, and is often used in empirical
applications (e.g., with age, democracy, etc.). The reason for my hypotheses is
that up to a certain critical threshold of homeownership, the advantages out-
weigh the disadvantages. At that point, however, the relationship turns around
because of a lack of investment into productive assets of the economy.
6.4 Research design
6.4.1 Data
I collected yearly data for a sample of 21 countries, namely Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ire-
land, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Switzer-
land, the United Kingdom, and the United States for the period from 2000 to
2014. The availability of data for the homeownership rate h was the limiting fac-
tor of the sample. Also, Eastern European countries were intentionally left out
because their housing sector was significantly influenced by political changes
in the early 1990’s and therefore, the mechanisms between housing and growth
could work differently.
For the saving rate, a country’s total investment as a fraction of its GDP
is used. These data are sourced from the World Economic Outlook (WEO)
database published by the International Monetary Fund. In the original Solow
model, the sum of the population growth rate, n, a rate of technological
progress, p, and a depreciation rate for capital, δ enter the model as one variable.
In empirical applications, it has become a convention to set p + δ equal to 0.05
(e.g., Mankiw et al., 1992; Islam, 1995; Bond et al., 2001). This is done because
the depreciation rate cannot be observed and technological change is assumed
to be the same for all countries and years. While Mankiw et al. take the growth
rate of the working-age population (aged 15–64), I follow the procedure of Is-
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lam and use the countries’ entire population. Annual population growth rates
come from the World Development Indicators (WDI) 2016 database provided
by the World Bank.
Following Mankiw et al., I further augment the Solow model human capital,
which is used instead of raw employment data as a proxy for labor supply. This
is done because the mere number of workers does not adequately account for
the quality of labor (e.g., Romer, 1994; Lucas, 1988; Mankiw et al., 1992; Islam,
1995; Barro, 1991, 2001, 2003; Caselli et al., 1996). Human capital can be defined
in many ways: as school enrollment rates, literacy, or the number of years of
schooling, to mention just a few. I decided to take the fraction of the labor
force with secondary education. The well-known Barro and Lee (2013) data for
educational attainment were not used because they are only available in 5-year
intervals. Initial per capita GDP and schooling data are sourced from the WDI
database.
Homeownership rates h come from various sources such as the Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the World Bank, or
the Economic Commission for Europe of the United Nations (UNECE). The
starting point, however, was a data set from Eurostat for the period 2005–2014.
In cases where the time series for a given country was too short, the quality
of the data was questionable or the data even drastically contradicted the data
provided by that country’s statistical office, that time series was compared to
and complemented by other sources. In particular, this was necessary for a
number of European countries, since data on housing are not collected as often
as in, say, the United States.
Missing data for gaps of one to three years were interpolated linearly using
adjacent homeownership rates because it is more than likely that, in the short
run, the homeownership rate increases linearly. Sometimes for two time series
from different sources (let’s say one for 2000–2008 and another one for 2009–
2014) there didn’t seem to be a smooth transition between the two series as
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the values for 2000–2003 deviated from the data for 2004–2014 by several per-
centage points. Because in these cases it wasn’t clear which of the two sources
measured the homeownership rate with error, the entire series was replaced
with data provided by the statistical offices of the respective country. After this
harmonization, the resulting time series covers the period spanning 2000–2014.
The control variables were gathered from the WDI and World Economic
Indicators (WEO) 2016 databases. GDP is measured in constant 2005 US dollars
and expressed as per-capita value (divided by that country’s population) and
the terms of trade are defined as export prices relative to import prices. The
saving rate, trade openness, government consumption, life expectancy and the
sum of population growth, technological progress and the depreciation rate are
expressed as logarithms. Data on long-term interest rates come from the OECD
and the European Central Bank.
Summary statistics and pairwise correlations are presented in tables 6.1 and
6.2, respectively. More information on data sources, the definition of the vari-
ables and further descriptive statistics can be found in the appendix in table 6.6
and figures 6.2–6.6.
Table 6.1: Summary statistics.
Variable Obs. Mean SD Min. Max.
GDP growth (p.c., %) 294 0.652 2.430 -9.305 6.517
Saving rate (%) 315 3.094 0.157 2.441 3.462
Population growth (%) 315 1.741 0.105 1.197 2.066
Initial GDP (p.c., ln) 315 10.530 0.371 9.691 11.383
Education (% with second. educ.) 302 44.399 11.173 12.1 65.2
Homeownership rate (%) 302 65.028 12.854 34.6 86.1
Government consumption (%) 314 2.961 0.195 2.301 3.312
Trade openness 314 4.384 0.529 3.098 5.925
Inflation (%) 315 2.053 1.259 -4.480 5.565
Interest rate (%) 311 4.186 1.917 0.647 22.498
Terms of trade 294 1.001 0.125 0.621 1.673
Democracy 315 9.902 0.374 8 10
Life expectancy (ln) 294 4.379 0.018 4.335 4.416
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Table 6.2: Correlation matrix.
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6.4.2 Methods
6.4.2.1 System GMM
To investigate the relationship of owner-occupied housing on economic growth,
the empirical model is underpinned by conditional convergence theory. This
theory claims that different economies reach different steady states depending
on their unique characteristics.
The baseline growth model is as follows:
git = α+ β1savingrateit + β2npdeltait + γ1gdpi,t−1 + γ2schoolingit
+ λ1hosrateit + λ2hosrate2it + ξin f lationi,t−1 + ρ
′zit + ε it
(6.2)
The coefficients β stand in front of the standard Solow variables, γ marks
the variables that appear in most augmented models, λ are the coefficients of
the actual variables of interest of this paper—the homeownership rate and its
square—and zit is a vector that contains all contemporaneous control variables.
Inflation appears separately because its lag and not its contemporaneous value
is used in the baseline model.
In a first naive regression set-up, the data was analyzed in a pooled ordi-
nary least squares (OLS) setting. The results should, however, be interpreted
with caution since OLS does not account for the heterogeneity of the sampled
countries. In addition, given the panel structure of the dataset and the hetero-
geneity of the economies in the sample, fixed effects regression analysis was
conducted. In both cases, however, the techniques only produce unbiased re-
sults when strict exogeneity of the regressors can be guaranteed. This is, how-
ever, not the case here because the lagged log GDP per capita shows up as a
regressor on the right-hand side of the equation:
git = f (yi,t−1; ...) (6.3)
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When git is the logarithmic per capita GDP growth rate and yi,t and yi,t−1
are the logarithms of per capita GDP, the equation may be written as follows:
yit − yi,t−1 = f (yi,t−1; ...) (6.4)
The lagged dependent variable yi,t−1 on the right-hand side turns the model
into a dynamic model. Such models can be properly analyzed with methods
that can tackle predetermined and endogenous variables. Nonetheless, it is
standard in the empirical growth literature to also report the results of OLS and
fixed effects even though they may be biased. The standard errors of the fixed
effects regression are heteroskedasticity-robust2.
To reduce a potential omitted variable bias, a range of standard socio-
economic variables enter the model as controls. But at the same time that the
control variables reduce an omitted variable bias, they introduce additional en-
dogeneity into the model, which means that some of the regressors could be
correlated with past and also current realizations of the error term. Moreover, it
is more than likely that the regressors are measured with error and that there is
reverse causality or simultaneity—meaning that GDP growth could also lead to
higher homeownership. Therefore and for the above stated reasons regarding
the panel dynamics, I use the system GMM estimator developed by Arellano
and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) to estimate the coefficients. This
is a standard technique used in the empirical growth literature3 and is suitable
for my analyses for a number of reasons.
First, system GMM is an appropriate method for dynamic models, i.e., for
models where the dependent variable is a function of its own lagged values.
Second, system GMM is applicable to panel datasets that are of the type
2Using clustered standard errors does not change the results.
3The system GMM estimator is an augmented version of the difference GMM estimator,
which was developed by Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) and Arellano and Bond (1991). It uses more
instruments than the difference GMM estimator and is thus more efficient (Roodman, 2009). For
a comprehensive overview of the advantages of system GMM over difference GMM, see Bond
et al. (2001).
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“large N, small T” (here: N = 21, T = 15). Past values of the dependent
variable may be correlated with the fixed effects in the error term, which would
result in estimates that are likely to be inconsistent. Nickell (1981) labels this
phenomenon “dynamic panel bias”. It is especially pronounced if there are
only few periods. System GMM helps reduce this problem of endogeneity.
Third, it is a good method to handle cases with endogeneity issues (such as
reverse causality, simultaneity, and omitted variables), which is usually the case
when aggregate measures such as GDP or growth are the dependent variable.
To solve the omitted variables problem, one could alternatively carry out an
IV regression. However, system GMM can handle over-identified systems—
which is the case when there are more instruments than regressors—and does
not require that there be good instruments available outside the system. Instead
of that, the potentially endogenous variables are simply instrumented by their
own lagged realizations. Nevertheless, an IV regression will be conducted in
the next section as well.
One-step and two-step system GMM estimation was carried out. The one-
step procedure assumes that the residuals are homoskedastic whereas the two-
step procedure relaxes this assumption by using the first-step residuals to con-
struct a consistent variance-covariance matrix in a second step, thus yield-
ing more asymptotically efficient results. Furthermore, the Windmeijer (2005)
finite-sample correction is made in the two-step regression to safeguard against
a potential downward bias of the estimates. Moreover, test of over-identifying
restrictions (the Hansen (1982) test), a joint F test of the variables, homeowner-
ship rate and (homeownership rate)2, and the Arellano and Bond (1991) m2 test for
autocorrelation are reported.
System GMM requires specifying which of the regressors are exogenous and
which are potentially endogenous. The terms of trade variable, adjusted popu-
lation growth, democracy and its squared term were assumed to be exogenous;
the others to be either endogenous or predetermined.
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Finally, the turning-point homeownership rate is computed as long as the
coefficients of the regression are significant. This is done following Checherita-
Westphal and Rother (2012) by optimizing a quadratic equation that yields the
maximum of a parabola of the form g(h) = ah2 + bh + c. Using the quadratic
formula, the two roots of such a parabola are h1,2 = − 12 ba ±
√
b2−4ac
2a . I exploit the
fact that a parabola is symmetric around its maximum, which lies right between
the two roots, i.e., at hcrit = − 12 ba . To compute the maximum, all one needs are
the two coefficients in front of the homeownership rate and its square, a and b.
6.4.2.2 Instrumental variables regression
One typical problem and well-known challenge in empirical applications is to
find an exogenous identification strategy. Since homeownership rates are en-
dogenous, i.e., they may be affected by GDP growth and unobservable charac-
teristics that cannot be controlled for, it cannot be guaranteed that the measured
effects on GDP growth can actually be attributed to a change in the homeown-
ership rates. This problem can be only partly reduced by system GMM. To
fully overcome this problem, an instrumental variable (IV) regression is esti-
mated as well; i.e., a regression where the endogenous variable is instrumented
by another variable that is exogenous. The IV regression will be estimated by
two-stage-least-squares (2SLS).
The selection of an appropriate instrument is challenging, as the instrument
has to satisfy two conditions: it must be relevant (i.e., the instrument has to be
correlated with the endogenous variable) and exogenous (i.e., it may affect the
dependent variable only through the endogenous variable but may not have a
direct relationship with the dependent variable). Such an instrument could be
divorce rates, which have no direct effect on GDP growth but on homeown-
ership rates, and are likely to be independent from economic hardship. The
latter was shown by Cohen (2014) who studies divorce during the U.S. reces-
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sion in 2008–2011. He concludes that strengthening family bonds or costs of
divorce during an economic downturn could prevent couples from divorcing
their spouse and that the additional stress level that a crisis exerts on an un-
happy married couple has a much lower effect.
Divorce rates as an instrument are far from perfect: divorcing is a lengthy
process whose outcome is observed long after the household has been dissolved
(Lersch and Vidal, 2014). Additionally, in some cases, couples do not divorce
at all even though they have separated (Andreß et al., 2006). Notwithstanding
these flaws, divorce rates are good instruments for the following reasons. Even
though they may not account for the level of homeownership rates (Germany
has similar crude divorce rates like Cyprus; yet, their homeownership rates
differ by roughly 30 percentage points), they might well account for changes
in these rates. Moreover, compared to marriage rates, divorce rates have a
stronger association with homeownership rates because not every couple that
owns a home is married but most likely the majority of married couples that
get a divorce will leave their joint home and transition from owning to renting
(at least one of the two, temporarily). It can thus be argued that divorce rates
satisfy the exogeneity condition.
While the exogeneity condition cannot be tested empirically, the relevance
condition can be assessed by having a closer look at the first-stage regression,
where the endogenous variable is regressed on the instrument and all other
exogenous variables. In this regression, the instrument is used to extract and
predict only the exogenous fraction of the independent variable while the en-
dogenous part is omitted. As a rule of thumb, the F-statistic of that regression
should be higher than 10, which indicates that divorce rates are a good instru-
ment for homeownership rates.
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6.5 Results
6.5.1 Full sample regression
The results of the baseline regression of equation 6.2 using different estima-
tion techniques are presented in columns (1)-(4) of table 6.3. These columns
document the results of (1) OLS, (2) fixed effects (FE) panel estimation, (3) one-
step system GMM with robust standard errors, and (4) two-step system GMM
with the Windmeijer (2005) correction. Columns (5) and (6) show the results
for slightly different specifications of the baseline model where schooling and
the homeownership rates are lagged by one period. Column (7) reports the IV
regression results, for which the 2SLS estimator is employed. The F-statistic of
the first-stage regression reveals that divorce rates are a relevant instrument for
homeownership rates.
The coefficients of the variables of interest, the homeownership rate and its
square, confirm the hypothesis that there is a hump-shaped relationship be-
tween the degree of homeownership in a country and its GDP growth. In all
specifications, the coefficient of the linear term takes on positive values whereas
the coefficient of the squared term is negative. This confirms the hypothesis that
homeownership is beneficial to economic growth up to a certain critical value.
When this rate is exceeded, however, the negative effects outweigh the positive
ones, and the net effect becomes negative. Divorce rates, which are used as
instrumental variables for the homeownership rates, provide further evidence
of a statistically significant relationship. In almost all cases, the coefficients of
the homeownership rates are statistically significant at the conventional levels.
Only in the FE regression, these coefficients become insignificant. This is likely a
consequence of the very little variation that the within-country homeownership
rates exhibit from year to year: since fixed effects method is a transformation
of OLS where averages at the country-level are subtracted, most of the (already
little) variation in homeownership rates is further reduced and the resulting
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differences have an almost unmeasurable impact on the dependent variable.
One of the most interesting results of this paper is the homeownership rate
at which the relationship between owning and growth becomes inverse. Re-
gardless of the model specification, this turning point seems to be at a rate of
around 68 percent4. Up to this point, the net effect of owning is dominant, but
any additional percentage point of homeownership higher than the threshold
harms the economy.
Most of the control variables show the expected signs; however, life ex-
pectancy as well as democracy and its squared version do oftentimes not be-
have as expected. This could be due to very little variation that the latter vari-
able shows in the data set. While democracy is distributed on the interval [-10;
10], it takes on only the values from 8 to 10 in the sample. This is also the reason
why in the fixed-effects regression the linear term is omitted: on this range of
data, the squared variable is an almost perfect linear combination of its linear
version, and the variable is dropped.
Regarding the robustness of the results against other specifications of the
model, one can see that the results of the estimations (5) and (6) confirm the
results previously found in the two-step system GMM baseline regression (4).
4Since it makes only sense to compute the turning point for coefficients that are significant at
the conventional levels, it is not computed for regression (2).
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Table 6.3: Homeownership and economic growth.
OLS FE One-step Two-step Two-step Two-step IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Homeownership rate 0.623*** 0.159 2.973** 3.278* 1.660**(L) 1.713**(L) 0.576***
(0.000) (0.728) (0.012) (0.061) (0.025) (0.018) (0.000)
(Homeownership rate)2 -0.005*** -0.001 -0.022** -0.025* -0.012**(L) -0.012**(L) -0.004***
(0.000) (0.884) (0.022) (0.062) (0.033) (0.039) (0.000)
Saving rate 11.009*** 11.193*** 17.249*** 20.992*** 16.619*** 23.223*** 9.838***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.004) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000)
Population growth -4.560*** -6.034*** -20.446*** -16.956 -18.624* -16.502 -5.484***
(0.006) (0.003) (0.002) (0.163) (0.085) (0.152) (0.001)
Initial GDP -1.860*** -32.699*** -0.962 -1.956 -2.180 -8.546 –
(0.002) (0.000) (0.774) (0.787) (0.667) (0.267)
Table continued on next page...
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Table 6.3: Homeownership and economic growth (continued).
OLS FE One-step Two-step Two-step Two-step IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Education .093*** 0.114* 0.290 0.317 0.286 0.306***(L) 0.051***
(0.000) (0.097) (0.188) (0.362) (0.280) (0.009) (0.000)
Government consumption -3.053*** -15.627*** -12.411 -12.747 -12.656 -19.050 -3.464***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.268) (0.407) (0.247) (0.206) (0.000)
Trade openness 0.716** 5.793*** 4.976 4.394 4.200** -0.032 0.315
(0.041) (0.002) (0.187) (0.292) (0.033) (0.993) (0.354)
Inflation (lagged) -0.726** -0.568*** -0.912*** -0.973*** -0.870** -0.806** -0.691***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.008) (0.026) (0.028) (0.000)
Interest rate -0.301*** -0.285*** -0.188 0.214 -0.151 -0.084 -0.162**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.503) (0.737) (0.742) (0.871) (0.032)
Terms of trade 3.754** -2.317 6.40 10.717 3.960 9.410 1.177
(0.038) (0.325) (0.276) (0.371) (0.672) (0.150) (0.447)
Table continued on next page...
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Table 6.3: Homeownership and economic growth (continued).
OLS FE One-step Two-step Two-step Two-step IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Democracy 18.844** 0.403* 82.082 -20.000 14.228 omitted 13.290
(0.046) (0.091) (0.193) (0.605) (0.652) (0.153)
Democracy2 1.015** omitted -4.457 1.115 -0.800 -0.092 -0.714*
(0.050) (0.192) (0.598) (0.651) (0.458) (0.161)
Life expectancy -42.078*** 27.784 -24.367 -8.131 -24.977 7.681 -45.224***
(0.000) (0.264) (0.409) (0.888) (0.444) (0.695) (0.000)
Constant 71.916 207.100** -374.201 omitted omitted omitted 105.609**
(0.154) (0.012) (0.138) (0.039)
Adj. R2 0.45 0.71 0.42
F-test 0.000 not reported 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
F(HOS rate, HOS rate2) 0.000 0.632 0.010 0.164 0.067 0.018 0.001
m2 test 0.083 0.190 0.068 0.071 –
Table continued on next page...
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Table 6.3: Homeownership and economic growth (continued).
OLS FE One-step Two-step Two-step Two-step IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Hansen test 0.165 0.091 0.066 0.011 –
Observations 256 256 256 256 255 256 251
Turning point (%) 68.17 67.95 66.34 70.62 69.83 66.49
p-values in parentheses. Standard errors are robust. *, **, and *** refer to significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. p-values are
reported for the F test (Wald test in (7)), joint F, m2 an Hansen tests. (L) denotes that the variable is lagged. Because the democracy values in the
sample don’t vary a lot (8 to 10), the squared democracy variable may be dropped due to multicollinearity. This is because the realizations of
the squared variable—64, 81 and 100—are almost a perfect linear combination of the non-squared realizations 8, 9 and 10.
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The null hypothesis of the m2 test for autocorrelation is that the errors are
serially correlated. In all regressions except regression (4), the null can be re-
jected. The null of the Hansen test is that the system is over-identified. In re-
gression (5) and (6) there is some reason to believe that the instruments may not
be valid. However, Roodman (2009) points out that this statistic should not be
relied upon too much because, as the number of instruments grows, it becomes
harder to satisfy all moment conditions at the same time.
6.5.2 Robustness checks
One may now object that the results might be driven by the poor performance
of some countries that were hit particularly hard and sustainably by the hous-
ing crisis, e.g., Cyprus, Spain, Greece, Italy or Portugal (see figure 6.6 in the
appendix). Therefore, a robustness check is conducted by running the regres-
sions without these countries during the housing crisis. A middle way had to
be found between leaving out the years 2007–2009 for all countries on the one
hand and leaving out only the crisis countries over the whole period on the
other hand. In order not to lose too many data points in the already limited
sample, the compromise was to leave out only data for the crisis countries dur-
ing the years of the housing crisis. This way, there are still enough data in the
sample to draw sensible conclusions.
The robustness check was run in two steps: first, only Cyprus, Spain, and
Greece (2007–2009) were left out. In the second step, Cyprus, Spain, Greece,
Italy, and Portugal (2007–2009) were left out. This is because Italy and Portugal
were hit not only by the housing crisis but continued to perform badly also dur-
ing the subsequent European debt crisis. In order to not conflate the two crises,
the two regressions were run separately. However, since both lead to the same
findings (qualitatively and quantitatively), only the second-step regression re-
sults are reported here.
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Table 6.4 reports the most important results of the regression. Even though
the results are less compelling in terms of the m2 and Hansen tests, the findings
concerning the meaningfulness of the homeownership variables and turning
point prevail. The turning point is just slightly higher than the previously found
average rate of around 68 percent. This is the result of dropping the countries
which suffered from their high homeownership rates during the housing crisis
on the one hand and, on the other hand, running the regressions on only those
countries that enjoyed economic growth even during the housing crisis.
Table 6.4: Homeownership and economic growth for non-crisis countries.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Homeownership rate 0.577*** 0.164 2.476** 3.892* 1.379**(L) 2.262**(L) 0.527***
(0.000) (0.730) (0.028) (0.071) (0.035) (0.017) (0.000)
(Homeownership rate)2 -0.004*** -0.001 -0.018* -0.029* -0.009*(L) -0.017**(L) -0.004***
(0.000) (0.888) (0.052) (0.084) (0.058) (0.039) (0.000)
Adj. R2 0.43 0.70 0.41
F-test 0.000 not reported 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
F(HOS rate, HOS rate2) 0.000 0.632 0.012 0.180 0.076 0.000 0.000
m2 test 0.040 0.210 0.020 0.059
Hansen test 0.346 0.089 0.102 0.267
Observations 241 241 241 241 240 241 236
Turning point (%) 69.42 70.16 67.95 73.04 65.82 67.38
p-values in parentheses. Standard errors are robust. *, **, and *** refer to significance levels of 10%, 5%,
and 1%, respectively. p-values are reported for the F test (Wald test in (7)), joint F, m2 an Hansen tests. (L)
denotes that the variable is lagged.
6.6 Discussion and conclusion
This paper is the first one that studies the relationship between GDP growth
per capita and homeownership at the aggregate level. The hypothesis of this
study is that homeownership can initially have a positive and, after reaching
a certain point, a negative relationship with economic growth, which is mod-
eled by introducing a linear and a squared term of the homeownership rate.
The paper shows that an inverse relationship between GDP growth and owner-
occupied housing indeed exists and that the initially positive impact on growth
starts to become negative at a homeownership rate of around 68 percent. Up
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to that point, homeownership has a significantly positive association with GDP
growth. The intuition for this finding is that owner-occupied housing has ben-
efits for the economy because of housing-related consumption; however, once
the homeownership rate of a given country becomes too high, the negative in-
fluences of owner-occupied housing outweigh the positive ones.
One explanation could be, for instance, that money spent on housing is con-
sumed and not invested: in the economic literature, investing implies that we
consume less today in order to consume more tomorrow. Tomorrow’s higher
consumption is possible because investments create additional future output
which makes GDP rise. If fewer homes were bought and more money (i.e., the
down-payment) was saved in bank accounts instead, banks could fulfill their
role as intermediaries and give these funds to companies as a loan, allowing
them to make investments with positive net present value that increase the ag-
gregate output of that country to raise future consumption. Mills (1987, 1989),
for instance, has estimated that a dollar invested in non-housing uses produces
more output than a dollar invested in housing.
Another negative factor that comes along with high homeownership rates is
that of personal bankruptcy. Although at first this risk doesn’t affect the econ-
omy in the aggregate but at the household level, owning leads to decreased in-
vestment alternatives because most homes are bought with a mortgage. Also, as
we move along the homeownership continuum, more owner-occupied housing
usually implies that more and more low-income households start to purchase
their homes. These households are most times not sufficiently wealthy to be
able to diversify when the bulk of their wealth is invested in one single asset,
the house. Thus, the value of their portfolio co-varies strongly with the value
of their house, and they are increasingly exposed to fluctuations in the local
economy (Goetzmann and Spiegel, 2000).
Likewise, a decrease in the labor mobility due to owning could lead to an
overall negative effect of high homeownership rates, as analyzed by Ferreira
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et al. (2010). One consequence of lower mobility of labor is explained by Blanch-
flower and Oswald (2013). They conclude that doubling the U.S. homeowner-
ship rate would be followed by more than a double increase in the unemploy-
ment rate.
For policy-makers the findings of this study imply that homeownership
should not be encouraged unconditionally. Owning increases consumption but,
at the same time, decreases investment in the economy. If at all, homeowner-
ship should thus be promoted with caution.
This paper adds to the growth and housing literature because it is the first to
address the homeownership–growth nexus at the aggregate level by investigat-
ing a hump-shaped relationship between the two. It analyzes GDP growth and
not consumption because higher consumption does not necessarily translate
into growth, as other components of GDP might be adversely affected when
consumption is increased. This research thus fills a gap which has so far been
neglected. It remains, however, open through which channels exactly home-
ownership affects GDP growth negatively. Moreover, of course, it has to be ac-
knowledged that homeownership rates, which result merely from the division
of two accounting numbers, may have little interpretative meaning. Therefore,
it is up to future research to develop measures that better reflect homeowner-
ship, have more meaning, and allow for better causal interpretations.
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6.7 Appendix
Figure 6.2: Homeownership rates across countries and years.
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Rates per country are depicted in figure 6.4 in the appendix.
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Table 6.5: Data sources.
Variable name Source(s)
GDP at market prices (constant 2005 US$) WDI
Homeownership rate (%) Various *
Government final consumption expenditure (% GDP) WDI
Life expectancy at birth, total (years) WDI
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) WDI
Long-term interest rate (annual %) OECD, ECB (for Cyprus)
Import value index WDI
Export value index WDI
Population Population growth (annual %) WDI
Total investment (% GDP) WEO
Trade (% GDP) WDI
Labor force with secondary education (%) WDI
Polity2 Center for Systemic Peace
Crude divorce rates (divorces per 1,000) Australian Bureau of Statis-
tics, Statistics Canada (2001–
2008 only), Eurostat, U.S.
National Center for Health
Statistics
As mentioned earlier, there was no single data set that included all homeownership
rates over the period 2005-2014. They were thus obtained from various sources: Euro-
stat, United Nations Bulletin of Housing Statistics, Australian Bureau of Statistics, Hypo-
Stat (European Mortgage Federation), Statistics Austria, Statistics Canada, Statistics Den-
mark, Statistics Finland, National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies of France,
Federal Statistical Office of Germany, Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations
The Hague, Statistics Norway, Federal Bureau of Statistics of Switzerland, Swiss Finance
Institute, Office for National Statistics of the UK, U.S. Census Bureau. The data set is
available upon request.
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Table 6.6: Definition of variables.
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Figure 6.3: Homeownership and GDP growth
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Figure 6.4: Homeownership over time
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Figure 6.5: GDP growth over time
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Figure 6.6: GDP over time
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